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To the student of the social sciences it is interesting to observe the
process by which, in one respect at least, we are drifting back to the
position of bygone ages. Although Aristotle pointed out the essential
interrelation of politics, ethics and economics, modern thought has suc-
cessfully vindicated the claims of these disciplines, as well as of others,
such as jurisprudence and the various divisions of public law, to be
considered .separate sciences. For a long time, however, to the common
detriment of all, the independence of each was so emphasized and exag-
gerated as to create the serious danger of forgetting that they are only
constituent parts of a larger whole. The tendency of recent thought has
been to accentuate the relations rather than the differences, and to ex-
plain the social institutions which form the bases of the separate sci-
ences in the light rather of a synthesis than of an analysis. This method
has been applied to the record of the past, as well as to the facts of the
present; the conception of history has been broadened until it is now
well recognized that political history is only one phase of that wider
activity which includes all the phenomena of social life. If the term “poli-
tics” is used in the common but narrow sense of constitutional and dip-
lomatic relations, then to repeat the familiar dictum, “History is past
politics,” is to utter a half-truth, in lamentable disregard of these newer
ideas.
While, however, it is now conceded that the history of mankind is
the history of man in society, and therefore social history in its broadest
sense, the question has arisen as to the fundamental causes of this social
development—the reason of these great changes in human thought and4/Edwin Seligman
human life which form the conditions of progress. No more profound
and far-reaching question can occupy our attention; for upon the correct
answer depends our whole attitude toward life itself. It is the supreme
problem not only to the scientist, but to the practical man as well. Of
this problem one solution has been offered which during the past few
decades has been engaging the lively attention of thinkers not alone in
Germany, where the theory originated, but in Italy, Russia and, to some
extent, in England and France. The echoes of the controversy have
scarcely reached our shores; but a movement of thought at once so bold
and so profound cannot fail to spread to the uttermost limits of scientific
thought and to evoke a discussion adequate to the nature of the problem
and the character of the solution.
We may state the thesis succinctly as follows: The existence of man
depends upon his ability to sustain himself; the economic life is there-
fore the fundamental condition of all life. Since human life, however, is
the life of man in society, individual existence moves within the frame-
work of the social structure and is modified by it. What the conditions
of maintenance are to the individual, the similar relations of production
and consumption are to the community. To economic causes, therefore,
must be traced in last instance those transformations in the structure of
society which themselves condition the relations of social classes and
the various manifestations of social life.
This doctrine is often called “historical materialism,” or the “mate-
rialistic interpretation of history.” Such terms are, however, lacking in
precision. If by materialism is meant the tracing of all changes. to mate-
rial causes, the biological view of history is also materialistic. Again,
the theory which ascribes all changes in society to the influence of cli-
mate or to the character of the fauna and flora is materialistic, and yet
has little in common with the doctrine here discussed. The doctrine we
have to deal with is not only materialistic, but also economic in charac-
ter; and the better phrase is not the “materialistic interpretation,” but the
“economic interpretation” of history.
In the following pages an attempt will be made to explain the gen-
esis and development of the doctrine, to study some of the applications
made by recent thinkers, to examine the objections that may be advanced
and finally, to estimate the true import and value of the theory for mod-
ern science.The Economic Interpretation of History/5
I
Few of the leading writers of the eighteenth or the first half of the
nineteenth century devoted much attention to the problem of historical
causation. The historians were for the most part content to describe the
facts of political and diplomatic history; and, when they sought for any-
thing more than the most obvious explanation of the facts, they gener-
ally took recourse to the “great man” theory or to the vague doctrine of
the “genius of the age.” Even the Nestor of modern historical writing,
Ranke, attempted scarcely more than to unravel the tangled skein of
international complications by showing the influence of foreign politics
upon national growth.
While most of the historians gave evidence of only a slight philo-
sophical equipment, the philosophers presented a “philosophy of his-
tory” which sometimes showed scarcely more familiarity with history.
That Rousseau was not a profound historical scholar, is to put it mildly.
Others, like Lessing in his Education of Humanity1 and Herder in his
Ideas on the Philosophy of History2 were too much under the domina-
tion of the theistic conception to give much impetus to a newer move-
ment of thought, even though Herder in Germany, like Ferguson3 in
Scotland, may be called in some respects a forerunner of modern an-
thropological investigations. Huxley, as well as many of the German
writers,4 has pointed out that Kant in his Idea of a Universal History5
anticipated some of the modern doctrines as to the evolution of society;
but even Kant was not sufficiently emancipated from the theology of the
age to take a strictly scientific view of the subject. With Hegel’s Phi-
losophy of History we reach the high-water mark of the “idealistic “in-
terpretation; but the Hegelian conception of the “spirit of history” has
shown itself at once too subtle and too jejune for general acceptance.
A second but less comprehensive attempt to interpret historical
growth in terms of thought and feeling was made by those who main-
tained that religion is the keynote of progress. That each of the five
great religions has exerted a profound influence on human development
is indubitable—Judaism typifying the idea of duty; Confucianism, of
order; Mohammedanism, of justice; Buddhism, of patience and Chris-
tianity, of love. But, entirely apart from the fact that this explanation
overlooks the possibility of regarding religion as a product rather than a
cause, no light is thrown on the question why the retention of the same
religion is often compatible with the most radical changes in the charac-
ter and condition of its devotees. The religious interpretation of history,6/Edwin Seligman
even in the modified form of Mr. Benjamin Kidd’s theory, has found but
few adherents.
A third explanation, which can be traced to Aristotle and which has
met with some favor among publicists, might be called the political
interpretation of history. It holds, substantially, that throughout all his-
tory there can be discerned a definite movement from monarchy to aris-
tocracy, from aristocracy to democracy, and that there is a constant
progress from absolutism to freedom, both in idea and in institution.
But very many philosophers, including Aristotle himself, have pointed
out that democracy might lead to tyranny; and modern anthropology
has tended to discredit the existence of the first alleged step. Above all,
it has been repeatedly shown that political change is not a primary, but
a secondary phenomenon; and that to erect into a universal cause what
is itself a result is to put the cart before the horse.
With the failure of all these attempts of a more or less idealistic
nature, the way was prepared for an interpretation of history which
would look to physical, rather than to psychical, forces; or rather which
would explain how the psychical forces, into which all social movement
may be analyzed, are themselves conditioned by the physical environ-
ment. The name with which this doctrine is associated is that of Buckle.
The theory of the predominant influence of the external world traced
to many writers of the eighteenth century, of whom Vico6 and
Montesquieu7 are easily the most famous.8 Buckle himself had no small
opinion of Montesquieu’s merits. He tells us9 that Montesquieu
knew what no historian before him had even suspected, that in the
great march of human affairs, individual peculiarities count for
nothing.... He effected a complete separation between biography
and history, and taught historians to study, not the peculiarities of
individual character, but the general aspect of the society in which
the peculiarities appeared.
Furthermore, we are told, Montesquieu
was the first who, in an inquiry into the relations between the
social conditions of a country and its jurisprudence, called in the
aid of physical knowledge in order to ascertain how the character
of any given civilization is modified by the action of the external
world.The Economic Interpretation of History/7
What Montesquieu, however, stated aphoristically and on the basis
of the imperfect physical science of the day, Buckle first worked out
philosophically and with such wealth of illustration that he is properly
regarded as the real creator of the doctrine. In his celebrated second
chapter, entitled . The Influence of Physical Laws,” Buckle analyzed
the effects of climate, food and soil upon social improvement and its
basis, the accumulation of wealth. Buckle, it is true, as we have been
lately reminded,10 does not claim that all history is to be interpreted in
the light of external causes alone. He does, indeed, tell us that in early
society the history of wealth depends entirely on soil and climate; but he
is careful to add that in a more advanced state of society there are other
circumstances which possess an equal, and sometimes a superior, influ-
ence.11 In fact, in a later chapter he maintains that “the advance of Euro-
pean civilization is characterized by a diminishing influence of physical
laws and an increasing influence of mental laws”; and he concludes that
if, as he has shown, “the measure of civilization is the triumph of the
mind over external agents, it becomes clear that of the two classes of
laws which regulate the progress of mankind, the mental class is more
important than the physical.”12 At the end of his general analysis he
even goes so far as to maintain that
we have found reason to believe that the growth of European civi-
lization is solely due to the progress of knowledge, and that the
progress of knowledge depends on the number of truths which the
human intellect discovers, and on the extent to which they are
diffused.13
While it is clear, therefore, that Buckle was by no means so extreme
as some of his critics would have us believe, it is none the less probable
that his name will remain associated with the doctrine of physical envi-
ronment. For it was he, after all, who most forcibly and eloquently called
attention to the importance of the physical factors and to the influence
that they have exerted in moulding national character and social life.
Since his time much more has been done, not only in studying, as Buckle
himself did, the immediate influence of climate and soil,14 but also in
explaining the allied field of the effect of the fauna and the flora on
social development. The subject of the domestication of animals, for
instance, and its profound effect on human progress has not only been
investigated by a number of recent students,15 but has been made the
very basis of the explanation of early American civilization by one of8/Edwin Seligman
the most brilliant and most learned of recent historians.16 A Russian
scholar17 has shown in detail the connection between the great rivers
and the progress of humanity, and the whole modern study of economic
geography is but an expansion on broader lines of the same idea.
Buckle, however, devoted most of his attention to the influence of
physical forces on the production of the food supply. With the difficul-
ties of the problem of distribution, which he confesses are of greater
importance, he declares himself unable to grapple. An exception, in-
deed, is to be made in the case of “a very early stage of society,” where
Buckle thinks he can prove that “the distribution of wealth is, like its
creation, governed entirely by physical laws.”18 His suggestive, but not
very successful, attempt to prove this point, which rests upon an accep-
tance of the one fundamental error of the classical economists -- the
wages-fund doctrine—can here only be mentioned.19 It is, however, im-
portant to emphasize the fact that, with this one exception, Buckle makes
no endeavor to throw any light on the connection between physical envi-
ronment and the distribution of wealth; for distribution, he tells us, de-
pends on “circumstances of great complexity, which it is not necessary
here to examine,” and of which, as he adds in a note, “many are still
unknown.”20
II
The explanation which Buckle made no attempt to give had been
advanced more than a decade before by another writer who was des-
tined to become far more famous and influential. Karl Marx enjoyed
some qualifications for the task which were denied to Buckle. Buckle
was, indeed, well abreast of the foreign, as well as the English, litera-
ture on history and natural science; but his economic views were almost
entirely in accord with those of the prevalent English school. These prin-
ciples so completely lacked the evolutionary point of view as to pre-
clude any historical treatment of history. Karl Marx, on the other hand,
not only possessed the philosophical and scientific equipment of a Ger-
man university graduate, but found himself in direct and unqualified
opposition to the teachings of the professional economists. While Buckle
contented himself with pointing out how physical forces affect the pro-
duction of wealth, Marx addressed himself to the larger task of showing
how the whole structure of society is modified by the relations of social
classes, and how these relations are themselves dependent on antecedent
economic changes. In Buckle it was primarily the physicist that createdThe Economic Interpretation of History/9
a certain materialistic interpretation of history; in Marx it was the so-
cialist that brought about a very different and specifically economic
interpretation of history. In order to understand the genesis of the eco-
nomic interpretation of history it will be necessary to say a few words
about the philosophical antecedents of Marx.
Like most of the young Germans of the thirties, Marx was a firm
believer in Hegel. The Hegelian philosophy, however, really contained
two separate parts—the dialectical method and the system. The funda-
mental conception of the Hegelian dialectic is that of process, or devel-
opment by the union of opposites—a method that advances from notion
to notion through negation. In all logic we begin with a half truth; we
proceed to its opposite, which is equally false; and we then combine
them into a third, which shows that they are equally true, when consid-
ered as necessary constituents of the whole.21 This idea of process, or
development, Hegel applied to his celebrated statement: “All that is real
is reasonable; all that is reasonable is real.” Interpreted in one way, this
would mean fatalism, or optimistic conservatism. But according to Hegel
everything that exists is by no means real. Only that is real which in the
course of its development shows itself to he necessary. When it is no
longer necessary it loses its reality. As some of his followers pointed
out, the French government had become so unnecessary by 1789 that
not it, but the Revolution, was real. Hence the original statement turns
into the opposite: All that is real becomes in the course of time unrea-
sonable, and is thus from the very outset unreal; all that is reasonable in
idea is destined to be realized, even though it may for the moment be
utterly unreal. The original statements of the reasonableness of what is
real, and of the reality of what is reasonable, blend into the higher state-
ment that all that exists is destined some day to pass out of existence.22
The importance of this dialectical method lay in the idea of pro-
cess—in the realization of the fact that the conclusions of human thought
and action are not final. Translated into social and political language, it
formed the basis of the aspirations of the liberal and progressive ele-
ments in the community. On the other hand, Hegel himself never drew
these radical conclusions from his theory because, although in his logic
he made it clear that the truth is nothing but the dialectical process
itself, he nevertheless posited, as a result of his whole philosophy, the
conception of the “absolute idea.” Into the mysteries of this absolute
idea we are not called upon to penetrate; it is sufficient to point out that,
as applied to the domain of social politics, it results in a moderate con-10/Edwin Seligman
servatism. It is in the then existing German state that, according to Hegel,
universality and individuality, law and liberty—the highest stage of the
universal spirit—find their reconciliation!
The antagonism between the dialectical and the absolute system of
Hegel was not at first perceived. Just as both individualists and social-
ists to-day claim Adam Smith as the fountain head of their doctrines, so
for a time both radicals and conservatives in Germany harked back to
Hegel. Toward the end of the thirties the schism became apparent. The
Young-Hegelians swore by the dialectical method and landed in radical-
ism; the orthodox followers remained true to the “absolute idea” and
became reactionaries. At first, however, politics was a dangerous field
to enter, and the discussion turned on religion. As either Catholicism or
Evangelical Protestantism was the state religion in each of the German
states, the attack on religion was indirectly political in character, and
was recognized as such. Strauss had set the ball rolling in 1835 by his
Life of Jesus. His assertion of the mythical character of the evangelist
accounts led to a famous dispute with Bruno Bauer, who went one step
farther and maintained that they were not even myths, but pure fabrica-
tions. In this reaction against the foundations of the state religion the
Young-Hegelians were practically forced back to the philosophical ma-
terialism of England and France in the eighteenth century. But they now
recognized the antagonism between their new views and the doctrine of
Hegel. While the philosophical materialists had posited nature as the
only reality, Hegel regarded the absolute idea—that is, the intellect and
its logical process—as the fundamental conception, and nature as only
the derivative or the reflex of the absolute idea.
The uncertainty continued until the early forties, when Feuerbach
published his Essence of Christianity,23 in which he sought to demolish
the idealistic or transcendental basis of all theology. In this work
Feuerbach claimed that nature exists independently of philosophy, that
there is in reality nothing but nature and man, and that our religious
conceptions are a product of ourselves, who again are nothing. but a
product of nature. Who has not heard of Feuerbach’s famous phrase:
Der Mensch ist was er isst—“Man is what he eats”? Feuerbach at once
showed the Young-Hegelians that, important as the Hegelian dialectics
may have been, the “absolute idea” was not the basis, but the product.
Feuerbach exerted a profound influence on the thinkers of the day.
Curiously enough, however, he also, in the domain of social politics,
gave rise to two antagonistic schools. Although in his philosophy aThe Economic Interpretation of History/11
materialist, or rather a “naturalist,” there was a decidedly idealistic strain
in his ethical doctrine. With him religion is what the etymology of the
word implies—the really important thing that binds men together. Of
his attempt to erect an idealistic religion on a naturalistic basis, this is
not the place to speak.24 But it is important to point out that his doctrine
of love as the basis of all religion led to the so-called “true” or “philo-
sophical” socialism of the forties in Germany. The early socialists had
accepted the views of the French reformers, St. Simon and Fourier. Now
they asserted that all that was necessary was to apply Feuerbach’s “hu-
manism” to social relations, in order to proclaim the speedy regenera-
tion of mankind. The leaders of the “philosophical” socialists, Karl Grün
and Moses Hess,25 for a time dominated the social movement in Ger-
many.
While the superimposed idealism of Feuerbach led to the “philo-
sophical socialism” of the forties, his original and basic naturalism helped
to produce in Karl Marx the founder of “scientific socialism.” Marx
was educated in Hegelianism, and to the end of his days loved to coquet
with the Hegelian dialectic. He had become a Young-Hegelian and was
deeply influenced by the appearance of Feuerbach’s book. This set him
thinking. The materialistic idea he accepted as beyond dispute, but he
recognized some of its weaknesses. The materialism of the eighteenth
century was essentially mechanical and unhistorical. It had developed
before science had assumed its modern garb. The watchword of modern
science is that of evolution through natural selection. Although this had
not yet been proclaimed even by the natural scientists, or at all events
had certainly not been applied by any one to social conceptions, the idea
was in the air; and, although Marx was not at first especially well versed
in natural science, the naturalism of Feuerbach, combined with the con-
ception of process in the dialectic of Hegel, led him finally to the theory
that all social institutions are the result of a growth and that the causes
of this growth are to be sought not in any idea, but in the conditions of
material existence. In other words, it led him to the economic interpreta-
tion of history. He then broke at once with the philosophical or senti-
mental socialists, and devoted all his time henceforth to the deeper study
of economic conditions.
That Marx’s analysis of economic conditions led him to scientific
socialism is a thing by itself, with which we have here no concern; for
that is an economic theory, based upon his doctrines of surplus value
and profits, which have been engaging the attention of economists12/Edwin Seligman
throughout the world. We need to lay stress on Marx’s philosophy, rather
than on his economics; and his philosophy, as we now know, resulted in
his economic interpretation of history. It chanced that he also became a
socialist; but his socialism and his philosophy of history are, as we shall
see later, really independent. One can be an “economic materialist” and
yet remain an extreme individualist. The fact that Marx’s economics
may be defective has no bearing on the truth or falsity of his philosophy
of history.
III
Let us now proceed to illustrate the development of the new doc-
trine from the writings of Marx himself. It will be advisable to quote
freely, because these earlier works of Marx are little known even in
Germany, and are almost unknown outside of Germany.26 Yet they are
of the utmost importance in showing the genesis of an idea which is now
one of the storm centres not only of economic and social, but also of
philosophical, discussion.
In his earliest essays we see only the radical political reformer. As a
young man of twenty-four, he was called in 1842 to the editorship of the
Rheinische Zeitung, a daily paper started in Cologne by some of the
Young-Hegelians who belonged to the radical party. While battling for
political reforms Marx had his attention called for the first time to eco-
nomic questions. He .severely criticised the historical school of
jurisconsults, because they regarded all existing legal institutions as the
necessary, and therefore the wise, result of a long evolution. To their
optimistic conservatism Marx opposed the Hegelian idea of liberty. It
was not, however, until after the Rheinische Zeitung had been suspended
by the government in 1843 that Marx went to Paris27 and became a
socialist—influenced largely by St. Simon and Proudhon, and possibly
by the celebrated book of Lorenz Stein, which appeared the year before,
on the socialistic and communistic movement in France.28 At Paris, Marx
started in 1844, in conjunction with another leader of the Young-
Hegelians, Arnold Ruge, the Deutsch-Franzöische Jahrbacher. Here
the beginning of the opposition to the French communists is perceptible;
for in the introductory editorial we are told that what has saved Ger-
many from “the metaphysical and fantastical ideas of Lamennais,
Proudhon, St. Simon and Fourier” is the Hegelian logic.29 Yet Marx
showed the influence of Feuerbach by writing an article in criticism ofThe Economic Interpretation of History/13
Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, in which he sought to prove how theologi-
cal criticism was now necessarily being replaced by political criticism.
Marx, indeed, went a step farther and emphasized the necessity of a
revolution of the fourth estate—the proletariat. He was beginning to
formulate his ideas on economic questions. “The relation of industry
and of the world of wealth in general to the political world is the chief
problem of modern times.”30 In another place he tells us that “revolu-
tions need a passive element, a material basis.”31 In a later essay in the
same periodical on the “Jewish Question,” in which he opposed the views
of Bruno Bauer, Marx claims that “we must emancipate ourselves be-
fore we can emancipate others.’‘32 He seeks to show that the importance
of the French Revolution consisted in freeing not only the political forces
of society, but also the economic basis on which the political super-
structure rested.33 The political change was in a certain sense idealism;
but it marked at the same time the materialism of society.34
The double number of the Deutsch-Fransöische Jahrbücher was
the only one that appeared. Ruge and Marx could not agree in their
attitude toward the question of communism. While in Paris, however,
Marx formed an intimacy with his lifelong friend, Frederick Engels,
whose acquaintance he had originally made while both were working on
the editorial staff of the Rheinische Zeitung.35 They now decided to
write in common a work against Bruno Bauer, who represented the more
speculative wing of the Young-Hegelians. This appeared in 1845 under
the title of The Holy Family.36 In this book, written almost entirely by
Marx, he shows the strong influence of Feuerbach.37 As he was at that
time, however, more interested in opposing the transcendental notions
of the other Young-Hegelians in general than in emphasizing the differ-
ences between himself and the “sentimental” socialists, it will not sur-
prise us to find him defending Proudhon.38 Yet even here Marx shows
the essentially mechanical nature of the older French materialism, and
points out how the philosophic materialism of Helvetius and Holbach
led to the socialism of Baboeuf and Fourier.39 Incidentally, Marx calls
attention to the economic basis of the French Revolution and points out
that the individual of the French Revolution differed from the individual
of classic antiquity because his economic and industrial relations were
different.40 Finally, in another passage he asks outright:
Do these gentlemen think that they can understand the first word
of history as long as they exclude the relations of man to nature,14/Edwin Seligman
natural science and industry? Do they believe that they can actu-
ally comprehend any epoch without gasping the industry of the
period, the immediate methods of production in actual life?... Just
as they separate the soul from the body, and themselves from the
world, so they separate history from natural science and industry,
so they find the birthplace of history not in the gross material
production on earth, but in the misty cloud formation of heaven.41
Although we find in Marx’s early works only these incidental allu-
sions to the doctrine of economic interpretation, we are told by Engels,
the literary executor of Marx, that Marx had worked out his theory by
1845.42 That Engels is quite correct in this is shown not only by the
quotations just mentioned, but also by the annotations which Marx made
to Feuerbach in 1845.43 Marx here objects to the old, mechanical mate-
rialistic doctrine that men are simply the results of their environment,
because it forgets that this environment can itself be changed by man.44
He also takes exception to Feuerbach’s whole view of religion, on the
ground that Feuerbach fails to perceive that man is the product of his
social relations and that religion itself is a social outgrowth.45 A fuller
statement of his new46 position, however, is found in some recently dis-
covered essays which were written at about that time.47 These articles,
published anonymously in the Westfälischer Dampfboot,48 are of cardi-
nal importance because Marx now for the first time emphasized his
disagreement with the “sentimental socialists.” In the first series of ar-
ticles, Marx criticises a German communistic sheet published in New
York, which was devoting much attention to the Anti-Rent Riots.49 Marx
discusses the agrarian movement in the United States and tries to show
from his new point of view the connection between economic and politi-
cal phenomena. In a second series of articles50 he joins issue with Grün
and Hess, the chief advocates of philosophical socialism, and ridicules
their failure to perceive that an alteration in methods of production brings
about changes in the whole social life.51
By 184752 Marx had made a somewhat deeper study of economic
history. He was now so convinced of the truth of his new theory that he
proceeded to make a furious onslaught on the older socialists in the
person of their chief representative—Proudhon. In reply to Proudhon’s
Philosophy of Misery Marx wrote his Misery of Philosophy. Here he
elaborates the theory that economic institutions are historical categories
and that history itself must be interpreted in the light of economic devel-
opment. We read—in French, it is true, for Marx wrote equally well inThe Economic Interpretation of History/15
German, English and French—that the conception of private property
changes in each historical epoch, in a series of entirely different social
relations.53 In a more general way Marx contends that all social rela-
tions are intimately connected with the productive forces of society. He
tells us that
in changing the modes of production, mankind changes all its
social relations. The hand mill creates a society with the feudal
lord; the steam mill a society with the industrial capitalist. The
same men who establish social relations in conformity with their
material production also create principles, ideas and categories in
conformity with their social relations .... All such ideas and cat-
egories are therefore historical and transitory products.54
In another place he maintains that “the relations in which the pro-
ductive forces of society manifest themselves, far from being eternal
laws, correspond to definite changes in man and in his productive
forces.”55 Marx applies this general law in many ways. Thus, in an
acute study of the doctrine of rent, he points out that rent in the Ricardian
sense is nothing but “patriarchal agriculture transformed into commer-
cial industry”;56 and, after explaining the historical growth of modern
agricultural conditions, he concludes by objecting to the whole classical
school, because it fails to see that economic institutions can be under-
stood only as historical categories.57 In another passage he contends
that money itself is not a thing, but a social relation, and that this rela-
tion corresponds to a definite form of production in precisely the same
way as exchanges between individuals.58 Finally, in analyzing the es-
sence of machinery and the historical importance of the principle of
division of labor, Marx tells us that “machinery is not any more of an
economic category than is the ox that pulls the plough; it is a productive
force. The modern factory, which is itself based on machinery, is a so-
cial relation, an economic category.”59 In short, social life at any one
time is the result of an economic evolution.
In the famous Manifesto of the Communist Party,60 which appeared
the following year, we find the implications, rather than the direct state-
ment, of the principle. After describing how the guild system of industry
gave way to the modern industrial system, based on the world market
and on the revolution in industrial production, Marx points out that the
bourgeoisie, in revolutionizing the methods of production, alters with
them the whole character of society, and displaces feudalism with mod-16/Edwin Seligman
ern conditions. At the present day this is a truism; but at the time the
manifesto appeared it was a novel and striking conception. Unfortu-
nately, the thought was so inextricably interwoven with Marx’s pecu-
liarly socialistic explanation of the effects of machinery, of the function
of capital and of the speedy cataclysm of society, that it made at the time
but little impression.
In the succeeding years Marx made various applications of his theory.
In 1849 he published a series of articles on Wage-Labor and Capital, in
the course of which he traced the reason for the change from slavery to
serfdom and to the wages system and again laid down the principle that
all relations of society depend upon changes in the economic life and
more particularly in the modes of production. He tells us that
with the change in the social relations by means of which indi-
viduals produce, that is, in the social relations of production, and
with the alteration and development of the material means of pro-
duction, the powers of production are also transformed. The rela-
tions of production collectively form those social relations which
we call society, and a society with definite degrees of historical
development .... Ancient society, feudal society, bourgeois society
are simply instances of this collective result of the complexes of
relations of production, each of which marks an important step in
the historical development of mankind.61
In a series of articles published in 1850, on “The Class Struggles in
France from 1848 to 1850,” Marx made the first attempt to apply his
principle to an existing political situation.62 He endeavored to show that
the great crisis of 1847 was the real cause of the February revolution,
and that the economic reaction of 1849 and 1850 was the basis of the
political reaction throughout the Continent. He followed this in 1852 by
another article on “The Eighteenth Brumaire,” in which he attempted to
lay bare the economic foundations of the coup d’état in France, and to
show that the empire really depended on the small farmer or peasant,
who had now become not a revolutionist, but a conservative.63 It is n
this work that we find the interesting bit of social psychology in which
the ideals of life themselves, as well as the views of any one individual,
no matter how eminent, are traced to social and economic causes:
On the various forms of property, on the conditions of social exist-
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formed sensations, illusions, methods of thought and views of life.
The whole class fashions and moulds them from out of their mate-
rial foundations and their corresponding social relations. The single
individual, in whom they converge through tradition and educa-
tion, is apt to imagine that they constitute the real determining
causes and the point of departure of his action.64
In another passage he contends that
men make their own history, but they make it not of their own
accord or under self-chosen conditions, but under given and trans-
mitted conditions. The tradition of all dead generations weighs
like a mountain on the brain of the living.65
During the early fifties, largely through the efforts of Mr. Charles
A. Dana, Marx was engaged to write a series of articles for the New
York Tribune, which, under the editorship of Horace Greeley, was de-
voting considerable attention to the Fourierist socialistic movement in
the United States. In these articles, which appeared in .English for a
period of over eight years, some of them anonymously, as editorials of
the Tribune, Marx discussed the general politics of continental Europe
in the light of his economic theory, and contributed in no mean degree to
the enlightenment of the American public.66 It was not, however, until
the appearance in 1859 of his first professedly scientific work, Contri-
butions to the Criticism of Political Economy, that Marx endeavored to
sum up his doctrine of economic interpretation and to show how this
induced him to attempt his analysis of modern industrial society. He
tells us that his
investigation led to the conclusion that legal relations, like the
form of government, can be understood neither of and in them-
selves nor as the result of the so-called general progress of the
human mind, but that they are rooted in the material conditions of
life .... In the social production of their every-day existence men
enter into definite relations that are at once necessary and inde-
pendent of their own volition—relations of production that corre-
spond to a definite stage of their material powers of production.
The totality of these relations of production constitutes the eco-
nomic structure of society—the real basis on which is erected the
legal and political edifice and to which there correspond definite
forms of serial consciousness. The method of production in mate-18/Edwin Seligman
rial existence conditions social, political and mental evolution in
general.67
And, after speaking of the periods when the old forces are in tempo-
rary conflict with the new, Marx proceeds:
With the alteration in the economic basis the whole immense su-
perstructure is more or less slowly transformed. In considering
such transformations we must always distinguish between the
material transformation in the economic conditions of production,
of which natural science teaches us, and the legal, political, aes-
thetic or philosophical—in short ideological forms, in which men
become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.68
In his great work on Capital, published eight years later, although
he continually takes it for granted, Marx nowhere formulates this law.
While the final chapter contains some interesting economic history of
England since the sixteenth century, Marx confines the discussion to a
study of the economic results rather than of the wider social or political
consequences. Partly for this reason and partly because the general public
did not distinguish between his historical views and his socialistic analysis
of existing industrial society, Marx’s view of history had at first but
slight influence outside of socialistic circles. After his earlier works came
to be studied more carefully, the younger Marxists pointed out the real
import of the historical principle. But it was not until the publication in
1894, eleven years after the death of Marx, of the third volume of Capi-
tal, with its wealth of historical interpretation, that the continental writ-
ers in general realized the significance of the theory; and it is only since
that time that the heated controversy has spread throughout the scien-
tific world.69 Since neither the earlier works of 1847 or 1859 nor any of
the later volumes of Capital have as yet been translated, the English-
speaking public has had only slight opportunity of grasping the real
significance of Marx’s theory or its corollaries.
In the first volume of Capital the only passage in which Marx defi-
nitely refers to his fundamental theory is tucked away in a note.70 Here
he compares his theory to that of Darwin and insists that it is based on
the only really materialistic method:
A critical history of technology would show how little any of the
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vidual. Hitherto there has been no such book. Darwin has inter-
ested us in the history of Nature’s technology, i.e., in the forma-
tion of the organs of plants and animals, which organs serve as
instruments of production for sustaining life. Does not the history
of the productive organs of man, of organs that are the material
basis of all social organization, deserve equal attention? And would
not such a history be easier to compile, since, as Vico says, human
history differs from natural history in this, that we have made the
former, but not the latter? Technology discloses man’s mode of
dealing with Nature,—the process of production by which he sus-
tains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of
his social relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow from
them. Every history of religion, even, that fails to take account of
this material basis, is uncritical. It is, in reality, much easier to
discover by analysis the earthly core of the misty creations of reli-
gion, than it is, conversely, to develop from the actual relations of
life the corresponding celestialized forms of those relations. The
latter is the only materialistic, and therefore the only scientific
method. The weak points in the abstract materialism of natural
science, a materialism that excludes history and its process, are at
once evident from the abstract and ideological conceptions of its
spokesmen, whenever they venture beyond the bounds of their own
specialty.
It is in the third volume of Capital that Marx gives a definite state-
ment of his theory, with some necessary qualifications, inattention to
which is partly responsible for some of the objections to the theory.
With this extract we may fitly close the series of quotations:
It is always the immediate relation of the owner of the conditions
of production to the immediate producers—a relation each of whose
forms always naturally corresponds to a given stage in the meth-
ods and conditions of labor, and thus in its social productivity—in
which we find the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire
social structure, and thus also of the political forms... This does
not prevent this same economic basis in all its essentials from
showing in actual life endless variations and gradations due to
various empirical facts, natural conditions, racial relations, and
external historical influences without number—all of which can
be comprehended only by an analysis of these conditions as they
are disclosed by experience.7120/Edwin Seligman
IV
We have now studied the genesis and development of the doctrine,
chiefly in the words of Marx himself. But, it will be asked, how far is
the theory of economic interpretation original with Marx?
There are, indeed, abundant traces of the connection between eco-
nomic causes and legal, political or social conditions to be found in the
literature of earlier centuries. Harrington, for instance, in his Oceana,
tells us that the form of government depends upon the tenure and distri-
bution of land. The very foundation of his whole theory is: “Such as is
the proportion or ballance of dominion or property in Land, such is the
nature of the Empire.”72 In the eighteenth century we find writers, like
Möser,73 who emphasized the influence of property in land on politics.
Especially in the socialists of the second quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury we find not infrequent allusions to a similar point of view. Fourier,
St. Simon, Proudhon and Blanc naturally call attention to the influence
of economic conditions on the immediate politics of the day,74 and the
first foreign historian of French socialism, Lorenz von Stein, elaborated
some of their ideas by positing the general principle of the subordina-
tion of the political to the economic life.75 The early minor German
socialists, such as Marr, Hess and Grün,76 as well as here and there
other writers,77 express themselves sporadically in like manner. But if
originality can properly be claimed only for those thinkers who not alone
formulate a doctrine but first recognize its importance and its implica-
tions, so that it thereby becomes a constituent element in their whole
scientific system, there is no question that Marx must be recognized as
in the truest sense the originator of the economic interpretation of his-
tory.78
It may be asked, finally, how far the other founders of scientific
socialism, Rodbertus and Lassalle, should share with Marx the honor of
originating the doctrine of economic interpretation of history. The ques-
tion of the priority of view as between Marx and Rodbertus was at one
time hotly discussed.79 The controversy, however, turned chiefly on the
specifically socialistic doctrines of labor and surplus value, which have
in their essentials nothing to do with the economic interpretation of his-
tory. Even as to that point, however, the friends of Rodbertus now con-
cede that the charges originally preferred against Marx were false.80 So
far as the economic interpretation of history is concerned, there is no
claim that Rodbertus originated or even maintained the doctrine.81
With reference to Lassalle, it would hardly be necessary to refer toThe Economic Interpretation of History/21
the matter at all, were it not for the fact that a prominent English econo-
mist has recently implied that the doctrine is first found in his writings.82
As a matter of fact, it is now conceded by the ablest students of social-
ism that Lassalle originated none of the important points in theory, even
though it is true that without the marvelous practical sagacity of Lassalle
the world at large would probably have heard but little of Marx and
Rodbertus. The International, in the hands of Marx, was a fiasco; prac-
tical socialism, in the hands of Lassalle, became a powerful political
and social force. But while Lassalle was a great agitator and statesman,
he was not a constructive thinker,—in economics, at all events; and
while Marx was a failure in practical life, he was a giant as a closet
philosopher,83 Whether or no we agree with Marx’s analysis of indus-
trial society, and without attempting as yet to pass judgment upon the
validity of his philosophical doctrine, it is safe to say that no one can
study Marx as he deserves to be studied—and, let us add, as he has
hitherto not been studied in England or America—without recognizing
the fact that, perhaps with the exception of Ricardo, that other great
economist of Jewish extraction, there has been no more original, no
more powerful, and no more acute intellect in the entire history of eco-
nomic science.
V
In the preceding sections we have studied the genesis and the early
formulation of the doctrine of historical materialism. Before proceeding
to discuss its applications, it may be well. to obviate some misunder-
standing by directing attention to what might be called, not so much the
modifications, as the further elaboration, of the theory.
In saying that the modes of production condition all social life, Marx
sometimes leads us to believe that he refers only to the purely technical
or technological modes of production. There are, however, abundant
indications in his writings to show that he really had in mind the condi-
tions of production in general.84 This becomes especially important in
discussing the earlier stages of civilization, where great changes oc-
curred in the general relations of production, without much specific al-
teration in the technical processes. The younger Marxists have devoted
much time and ability to the elucidation of this point.
In the first place, even though it is claimed that changes in tech-
nique are the causes of social progress, we must be careful not to take
too narrow a view of the term. The adherents of the theory point out22/Edwin Seligman
that, when we speak of technique in social life, we must include not only
the technical processes of extracting the raw material and of fashioning
it into a finished product, but also the technique of trade and transporta-
tion, the technical methods of business in general and the technical pro-
cesses by which the finished product is distributed to the final consumer.
Marx intimated this repeatedly, and Engels has stated it clearly in a
letter, in which he sums up the ideas for which he and Marx contended:
We understand by the economic relations, which we regard as the
determining basis of the history of society, the methods by which
the members of a given society produce their means of support
and exchange the products among each other, so far as the divi-
sion of labor exists. The whole technique of production and of
transportation is thus included. Furthermore, this technique, ac-
cording to our view, determines the methods of exchange, the dis-
tribution of products and, hence, after the dissolution of gentile
society, the division of society into classes, the relations of per-
sonal control and subjection, and thus the existence of the state, of
politics, of law, etc .... Although technique is mainly dependent
on the condition of science, it is still more true that science de-
pends on the condition and needs of technique. A technical want
felt by society is more of an impetus to science than ten universi-
ties.85
The term technical must thus be broadened to include the whole
series of relations between production and consumption. It is for this
reason that we speak not so much of the technical interpretation of his-
tory—which would lead to misunderstanding—as of the economic in-
terpretation of history.
The originators of the theory, moreover, go still further. When they
speak of the materialistic or economic conception of history, they not
only refuse to identify “economic” with “technical” in the narrow sense,
but they do not even mean to imply that “economic” excludes physical
factors. It is obvious, for instance, that geographical conditions, to some
degree and under certain circumstances, affect the facts of production.
To the extent that Buckle pointed this out, he was in thorough accord
with Marx; but the geographical conditions, as Marx has himself main-
tained, form only the limits within which the methods of production can
act. While a change of geographical conditions may prevent the adop-
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conditions are often compatible with entirely different methods of pro-
duction. Thus, Marx tells us:
It is not the mere fertility of the soil, but the differentiation of the
soil, the variety of its natural products, the changes of the seasons,
which form the physical basis for the social division of labor, and
which, by changes in the natural surroundings, spur man on to the
multiplication of his wants, his capabilities, his means and modes
of labor. It is the necessity of bringing a natural force under the
control of society, of economizing, of appropriating or subduing it
on a large scale by the work of man’s hand, that first plays the
decisive part in the history of industry.86
He goes on to explain, however, that “favorable natural conditions
alone give us only the possibility, never the reality,” of definite eco-
nomic methods of production and distribution of wealth. In the same
way, Engels’ concedes that the geographical basis must be included in
enumerating the economic conditions, but contends that its importance
must not be exaggerated.
This is, however, by no means the most important elaboration of the
theory. In the interval that elapsed between the first statement of the
theory in the forties and the death of Marx the founders of the doctrine
had little reason to moderate their statements. But after the death of
Marx, and especially when the theory began to be actively discussed in
the social-democratic congresses, the extreme claims of the orthodox
Marxists began to arouse dissent, even in the ranks of the socialists
themselves. Partly as a result of this, partly because of outside criti-
cism, Engels now wrote a series of letters in which he endeavored to
phrase his statement of the theory so as to meet some of the criticisms.
In these letters87 he maintained that Marx had often been misunderstood
and that neither he himself nor Marx ever meant to claim an absolute
validity for economic considerations to the exclusion of all other fac-
tors. He pointed out that economic actions are not only physical actions,
but human actions, and that a man acts as an economic agent through
the use of his head as well as of his hands. The mental development of
man, however, is affected by many conditions; at any given time the
economic action of the individual is influenced by his whole social envi-
ronment, in which many factors have played a role. Engels confessed
that Marx and he were “partly responsible for the fact that the younger
men have sometimes laid more stress on the economic side than it de-24/Edwin Seligman
serves”; and he was careful to point out that the actual form of the social
organization is often determined by political, legal, philosophical and
religious theories and conceptions. In short, when we read the latest
exposition of their views by one of the founders themselves, it almost
seems as if the whole theory of economic interpretation had been thrown
overboard.
It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that these concessions,
undeniably significant as they are, involved in the minds of the leaders
an abandonment of the theory. Engels continued to emphasize the fun-
damental significance of the economic life in the wider social life. The
upholders of the doctrine remind us that, whatever be the action and
reaction of social forces at any given time, it is the conditions of produc-
tion, in the widest sense of the term, that are chiefly responsible for the
basic permanent changes in the condition of society. Thus, Engels tells
us that we must broaden our conception of the economic factor so as to
include among the economic conditions, not only the geographical ba-
sis, but the actually transmitted remains of former economic changes,
which have often survived only through tradition or vis inertiae, as well
as the whole external environment of this particular form. He even goes
so far as to declare the race itself to be an economic factor. And, while
he still stoutly contends that the political, legal, religious, literary and
artistic development rests on the economic, he points out that they all
react upon one another and on the economic foundation.
It is not that the economic situation is the cause, in the sense of
being the only active agent, and that everything else is only a pas-
sive result. It is, on the contrary, a case of mutual action on the
basis of the economic necessity, which in last instance always works
itself out.88
A controversy that has arisen since Engels’s death may serve to
bring out the thought more clearly. A number of suggestive writers, of
whom Gumplowicz89 is perhaps the most important, have attempted to
explain some of the leading facts in human development by the exist-
ence of racial characteristics and race contests. Yet we now have an
interesting work by a Frenchman, who does not even profess himself an
advocate of the economic interpretation of history, maintaining, with
some measure of success, that the majority of different racial character-
istics are the results of socio-economic changes which are themselves
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tive to-day of the school of LePlay, has—at least, so far as appears from
his writings—never even heard of Marx or his theory, and we find in his
work very little of the detail of the class conflict which primarily inter-
ested the socialists. But while Demolins reverts in essence to what might
be called the commercio-geographical explanation of history, he is care-
ful to point out how the conditions of physical life affect the methods
and relations of production, and how these in turn are largely respon-
sible for the differentiation of mankind into the racial types that have.
played a role in history. Thus, from his point of view, the race is largely
an economic product, and we begin to understand what Engels meant
when he declared the race itself to be an economic factor.
The theory of economic interpretation thus expounded by Engels
must be considered authoritative. He tells us that Marx never really
regarded the situation in any other light. Nevertheless, it cannot be de-
nied that there are passages in Marx which seem to be more extreme,
and which represent the doctrine in that cruder form which is so fre-
quently met with among his uncritical followers. We are bound, how-
ever, to give him the benefit of the doubt; and we must not forget that
when a new theory supposed to involve far-reaching practical conse-
quences is first propounded, the apparent needs of the situation often
result in an overstatement, rather than an understatement, of the doc-
trine.
We understand, then, by the theory of economic interpretation of
history, not that all history is to be explained in economic terms alone,
but that the chief considerations in human progress are the social con-
siderations and that the important factor in social change is the eco-
nomic factor. Economic interpretation of history means, not that the
economic relations exert an exclusive influence, but that they exert a
preponderant influence in shaping the progress of society.
So much for a preliminary statement of the real content of the eco-
nomic conception of history, as explained and elaborated by the founders
themselves. In a subsequent section we shall revert to this point and
attempt to analyze somewhat more closely the actual connection be-
tween the economic and the wider social relations of mankind.
VI
Let us now proceed to study some of the applications that have been
made of the theory of the economic interpretation of history. We can
pursue this study without prejudicing the final decision as to the truth of26/Edwin Seligman
the doctrine in its entirety. For it is obvious that we may refuse to admit
the validity of the theory as a philosophical explanation of progress as a
whole, and yet be perfectly prepared to admit that in particular cases the
economic factor has played an important role. It is natural, however,
that the economic influence in any given set of facts should be empha-
sized primarily by those whose general philosophical attitude would
predispose them to search for economic causes. It will not surprise us,
then, to find that much good work in this direction has been accom-
plished by the originators of the theory and their followers.
Marx himself made no mean contribution to the facts. Some of his
statements are erroneous, and not a few of his historical explanations
are farfetched and exaggerated; but there remains a considerable sub-
stratum of truth in his contributions to the subject. Of these contribu-
tions the most familiar is the account of the transition from feudal to
modern society, due to the genesis in the seventeenth century of capital
gs a dominant industrial factor and to the industrial revolution of the
eighteenth century. It was Marx who first clearly pointed out the nature
of the domestic system and its transformation into the factory system of
our age, with the attendant change from the local to the national market
and from this, in turn, to the world market. It was Marx, again, who
called attention to the difference between the economic life of classic
antiquity and that of modern times, showing that, while capital played
by no means an insignificant role in ancient times, it was commercial
and not industrial capital, and that much of Greek and Roman history is
to be explained in the light of this fact. It was Marx, too, who first
disclosed the economic forces which were chiefly responsible for the
political changes of the middle of the nineteenth century. And, finally,
while Marx had originally devoted comparatively little attention to primi-
tive civilization, we now know that in his manuscript notes he applied
his doctrine in a suggestive way to the very first stages of social evolu-
tion.91
It is perhaps in the early history of mankind that the most signal
additions to our knowledge have been made by recent writers. The pio-
neer in this field was our great compatriot, Morgan. He was really the
first to explain the early forms of human association and to trace society
through the stages of the horde, the clan, the family and the state. More-
over, although he did not work it out in detail or give his theory any
name, there is no doubt that he independently advanced the doctrine of
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that it applied to anything but the early stages. Because of the great
neglect by subsequent writers of this part of Morgan’s achievements, it
is necessary to call attention to it at somewhat greater length.
Morgan starts out with the guarded statement that it is “probable
that the great epochs of human progress have been identified more or
less directly with the enlargement of the sources of subsistence.’‘92 The
great epochs of which he speaks, however, cease, in his opinion, with
the introduction of field agriculture.93 He discusses the assumption of
original promiscuity in the human race and maintains that, while it prob-
ably existed at first, it is not likely that it was long continued in the
horde, because the latter would break up into smaller groups for subsis-
tence and fall into consanguine families.94 In his treatment of the depen-
dence of early man upon the physical characteristics of the food supply,
he takes up in turn the early natural subsistence upon fruits and roots,
the connection of fish subsistence with savagery and migration, the re-
lations between the discovery of cereals, the cessation of cannibalism
and the reliance on a meat and milk diet, the connection between the
domestication of animals and pastoral society and, finally, the transition
of what he calls horticulture into agriculture.95 In all this we seem to be
getting little beyond Buckle. What differentiates Morgan entirely from
Buckle, however, is the fact that, while the latter confines him, self to
the simple problem of production, Morgan works out the influence of
all these factors upon the social and political constitution and traces the
transformation of society to changes in the form and conditions of prop-
erty.
Although Morgan did not succeed in making thoroughly clear the
economic causes of the early tracing of descent from the female line, he
did call attention to the connection between the growth of private prop-
erty and the evolution of the horde into the clan or, as he calls it, the
gens.96 He elucidated still more clearly the causes of the change of de-
scent from the female to the male line, showing how it went hand in
hand with the extension of the institution of private property.97 The ac-
count of the development of slavery98 is perhaps not so novel; but the
suggestion of an economic basis for the transition from the clan to the
patriarchal family99 and from the polygamic to the monogamic family100
was as striking as it was original.
While Morgan was in no way an economist and had probably never
heard either of Marx or of the historical school of economics, his final
conclusion as to the relations of private property to social welfare is in28/Edwin Seligman
substantial agreement with modern views. He tells us that:
Since the advent of civilization the outgrowth of property his been
so immense, its forms so diversified, its uses so expanding and its
management so intelligent in the interests of its owners, that it
has become, on the part of the people, an unmanageable power.
The human mind stands bewildered in the presence of its own
creation. The time will come, nevertheless, when human intelli-
gence will rise to the mastery over property and define the rela-
tions of the state to the property it protects as well as the obliga-
tion and the limits of the rights of its owners. The interests of
society are paramount to individual interests and the two must be
brought into just and harmonious relations.101
The greater part of Morgan’s Ancient Society, as well as of his
other works,102 was, however, devoted to an account of the historical
facts, rather than of their economic causes. The controversy which at
once sprang up in England, and which has lasted almost to the present
time, turned well-nigh exclusively upon the first set of considerations.
When scientists were not agreed upon the facts, it would seem useless to
speculate about the causes of the facts. The trend given to the discus-
sion by this early controversy is largely responsible for the fact that
until very recently writers on sociology or social history have almost
completely neglected the economic aspect of the transitions which they
describe.103 But, although some parts of Morgan’s theory—like the de-
tails of the earliest consanguine family and the perhaps somewhat hasty
generalization as to primitive promiscuity—have been modified, the
substance of his account of the uterine or maternal clan and of its devel-
opment into the tribe and the state, as well as of the dependence of the
transition upon changes in the forms of property, have become incorpo-
rated into the accepted material of modern science.
It was not, however, until the German advocates of the economic
interpretation of history took the matter up that Morgan’s real impor-
tance was recognized. Engels published in 1884 his Origin of the Fam-
ily, in which he showed that Morgan’s views marked a distinct advance
upon those of Bachofen and McLennan, and claimed that the English
archaeologists of the day had really adoptod Morgan’s theory without
giving him credit. Turning from the account of the develop merit to its
causes, Engels accepted all of Morgan’s conclusions as to the early
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step further by combining, as he tells us, Morgan and Marx. Engels
ascribed the transformation of gentile society to the first great social
division of labor—the separation of pastoral tribes from the rest of so-
ciety. This in itself gave rise to intertribal exchange as a permanent
factor in economic life, and it was not long before intertribal exchange
led to barter between individuals—a barter chiefly in cattle and natural
products. With the transition from common to private property in such
movables, the ground was prepared, on the one hand, for slavery and,
on the other, for the downfall of the matriarchate. As private property
increased we find the second great step in the division of labor—the
separation of manual industry from agriculture. Exchange now becomes
an exchange of commodities, and with the economic supremacy of the
male there appear the patriarchate and then the monogamic family. Fi-
nally comes the third step in the division of labor—the rise of the mer-
chant class, with the use of metallic money. The growth of capital, even
if it be mercantile capital (as against the original cattle capital), ushers
in a state of affairs with which the old gentile organization is no longer
able to cope; and thus we find the origin of the political organization,
the genesis of the state. In Greece, in Rome and in the Teutonic races of
the easy middle ages this transition is a matter of record; but no one
before Morgan and Engels had been able to explain it intelligibly.
The hints thrown out by Morgan and Engels have been worked up
by a number of writers, few of whom can be classed as socialists. At
first the professed sociologists paid but little attention to the matter.
With Kovalevsky, in 1890, we begin the series of those who attempted
to prove a somewhat closer connection between the family and private
property.104 In 1896 Grosse devoted a separate volume to the subject105
and brought out some new points as to the influence of economic condi-
tions upon the character of the family, especially in the case of nomadic
peoples and the early agriculturists. In the same year Professor
Hildebrand published an admirable work on Law and Custom in the
Different Economic Stages, in which, although not neglecting the ear-
lier phases of social life, he laid the emphasis on the economic basis of
the primitive agricultural community.106 For the still earlier period note-
worthy work has been done by Cunow. After having prepared the way
by a study of the systems of consanguinity among the Australians107
Cunow published in 1898 a series of articles on the economic basis of
the matriarchate.108 He emphasized the essential weakness, from the
historical point of view, of the ordinary classification into hunting, pas-30/Edwin Seligman
toral and agricultural stages.109 Beginning, however, with the hunting
stage, Cunow maintains that the earliest form of organization rests on
the supremacy of the man, which is not by any means the same thing as
the supremacy of the father; for the polygamic or monogamic family
which forms the basis oi the patriarchal system was of much later devel-
opment. In the early stages we may have a uterine society—that is, a
tracing of descent through the mother—but we have no matriarchate.110
Cunow gives the economic reasons which explain this tracing of the
descent through the female and shows how, under certain conditions,
she becomes more sought after until finally she attains such an eco-
nomic importance that the matriarchate itself develops.111 Incidentally
he traces the connection between the female and early agriculture, and
explains how her growing importance, both in and out of the home,
exerted a decided influence upon the early division of labor. The matri-
archate is shown very dearly to be largely an economic product.112
In 1901 Cunow followed up his exposition by another series of es-
says on “The Division of Labor and the Rights of Women.”113 Here he
points out the error of the usual statement that agriculture is a condition
precedent to a disappearance of the nomadic life. On the contrary, main-
tains Cunow, a certain degree of stationary settled activity is a condition
precedent to the transition to agriculture.114 Agriculture, however, may
develop either out of the pastoral stage or out of the hunting stage, and
in each case the activity of the female is of cardinal importance. The
female is not only the primitive tiller of the soil, but also the creator of
the earliest house industry, which plays such a distinctive role in primi-
tive barter.115 The earliest division of labor rests on the principle that the
female attends to the vegetable sustenance, the man to the animal diet,
and on this fundamental distinction all the other social arrangements are
built up. Marriage for a long time is not an ethical community of ideal
interests, but very largely an economic or labor relation.116
Of much the same character as this investigation are the attempts
made still more recently to supply an economic explanation for the ori-
gin of totemism117 and to study the economic causes of slavery. Espe-
cially on the latter topic our knowledge of the early conditions has been
greatly increased by the detailed study of Nieboer.118 This writer, who
accepts the theory of the brilliant Italian economist Loria, has over-
turned many of the former notions on the subject and has studied sla-
very, not only, as most writers have done, in the agricultural stage of
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the later period of classic antiquity, Ciccotti has shed considerable light
on the origin and development of slavery in Greece, as well as in Rome,
and has traced the connection between this fundamental fact and the
entire political and social history.119 Other writers, such as Francotte120
and Pohlmann,121 have considered more in detail the economic status of
Greece and its influence on national and international conditions.
In the case of Roman history the relation between the land question
and national progress has always been so obvious that such historians
as Nitzsch and Mommsen did not have to wait for the rise of the school
of economic interpretation. Even in the case of Rome, however, good
work has since then been done, especially in the imperial period, in
emphasizing the controlling influence of economic factors on the gen-
eral development.122 So, also, some neglected points in the history of
Hebrew antiquity have been brought out by writers like Beer and
Mehring.123
When we come to more recent periods of history, there is an embar-
rassment of riches. The economic forces which were instrumental in
shaping the transition from feudal to modern society are so obvious that
the historians have for some time been laying stress on economic inter-
pretation almost without knowing it. This is true, for instance, in the
treatment of the military system, which has been clearly described by
Bürkli in his account of the transition in Switzerland.124 One of the most
accomplished of Belgian historians, Des Marez, has recently voiced his
conviction that
no one can investigate the deeper causes that have influenced the
peoples between the Rhine and the North Sea without perceiving
that it is above all the economic conditions, and not racial, lin-
guistic or other factors, that have determined national progress.125
The newer view has led investigators to accentuate the economic
factor not only in the Crusades126 but also in the Reformation with the
victory of Calvinism and Puritanism.127 The professed historians them-
selves have been so far influenced by the movement that Lamprecht,
one of the most distinguished of German scholars, has recently made the
economic factor the very foundation of the entire political and social
development of mediaeval Germany.128 In the acrimonious discussion
which this “audacious” move has engendered—a discussion not yet con-
cluded—the gradual triumph of the newer tendency seems by no means32/Edwin Seligman
improbable.129 When we approach the centuries nearer our own time, it
has almost become a commonplace to explain in economic terms the
political transition of England in the eighteenth century, as well as the
French and American revolutions. To take only a few examples from
more recent events, it is no longer open to doubt that the democracy of
the nineteenth century is largely the result of the industrial revolution;
that the entire history of the United States to the Civil War was at bot-
tom a struggle between two economic principles; that the Cuban insur-
rection against Spain, and thus indirectly the Spanish-American War,
was the outcome of the sugar situation; or, finally, that the condition of
international politics is at present dominated by economic considerations.
Wherever we turn in the maze of recent historical investigation, we are
confronted by the overwhelming importance attached by the younger
and abler scholars to the economic factor in political and social progress.
VII
We come now to the most important part of the subject—a consid-
eration, namely, of the objections that have been urged to the doctrine
here under discussion. Some of these objections, as we shall learn later,
are indeed weighty, but others possess only. a partial validity. Yet the
emphasis is commonly put by the critics of economic interpretation on
the weak, rather than on the sound, arguments. It will be advisable,
then, to consider first and at grater length some of these alleged objec-
tions, reserving for later treatment those criticisms which possess greater
.force.
Among the criticisms commonly advanced, the more usual may be
summarized as follows: First, that the theory of economic interpretation
is a fatalistic theory, opposed to the doctrine of free will and overlook-
ing the importance of great men in history; second, that it rests on the
assumption of “historical laws” the very existence of which is open to
question; third, that it is socialistic; fourth, that it neglects the ethical
and spiritual forces in history; fifth, that it leads to absurd exaggera-
tions.
It will be observed that these criticisms fall into two categories. The
one category takes exception, not only to the economic interpretation of
history, but to the general social interpretation of history. The other
class of objections does not deny that the controlling forces of progress
are social in character, but contends that we must not confound eco-
nomic with social considerations and that the economic factor is of noThe Economic Interpretation of History/33
more importance than any of the other social factors. In the above list
the first and second criticisms are to be included in the former category;
the third and the fifth in the latter; while the fourth criticism is so broad
that it falls partly in each category.
We begin with the first class of criticisms because some writers
think that they are triumphantly refuting the economic interpretation of
history, when they are in reality directing their weapons against a far
more comprehensive structure of ideas, which very few of the oppo-
nents of the economic interpretation of history would like to see demol-
ished. Let us consider, then, the objection that the doctrine is fatalistic,.
that it is opposed to the theory of free will and that it overlooks the
importance of great men in history.
It is obvious that this is not the place to enter into a general philo-
sophical discussion of determinism. For our purposes it is sufficient to
state that, if by freedom o[ the will we simply mean the power to decide
as to an action, there is no necessary clash with the doctrine of economic
or social interpretation. The denial of this statement involves a fallacy,
which in its general aspects has been neatly hit off by Huxley:
Half the controversies about the freedom of the will... rest upon
the absurd presumption that the proposition “I can do as I like” is
contradictory to the doctrine of necessity. The answer is; nobody
doubts that, at any rate within certain limits, you can do as you
like assertion of the consciousness of their freedom, which is the
favorite refuge of the opponents of the doctrine of necessity, is
mere futility, for nobody denies it. What they really have to do, if
they would upset the necessarian argument, is to prove that they
are free to associate any emotion whatever with any idea however;
to like pain as much as pleasure; vice as much as virtue; in short,
to prove that, whatever may be the fixity of order o[ the universe
of things, that of thought is given over to chance.130
In other words, every man has will power and may decide to act or
to refrain from acting, thus showing that he is in this sense a free agent.
But whether he decides in the one way or the other, there are certain
causes operating within the organism which are responsible for the de-
cision. The function of science is to ascertain what these causes are. All
that we know thus far is that every man is what he is because of the
influence of environment, past or present. We need not here enter into
the biological disputes between the Weissmannist and the Neo-Lama-34/Edwin Seligman
rckian; for, whether we believe, with the one, that the only factor in
progress is the power of natural selection to transmit and strengthen
congenital characteristics or, with the other, that acquired characteris-
tics are also inherited, we are dealing in each case with the operation of
some form of past environment. Neither Weissmanists nor Neo-
Lamarckians deny the obvious fact of the influence of present environ-
ment on the individual, as such.
Since, therefore, man, like everything else, is what he is because of
his environment, past and present,—that is, the environment of his an-
cestors, as well as his own,—it is dear that, if we knew all the facts of
his past and present environment, we should be in a much better posi-
tion to foretell with some degree of precision the actions of every human
being. Although a man is free to steal or not to steal, we are even now
safe in predicting that under ordinary circumstances an honest man will
not steal. His congenital and acquired characteristics are such that un-
der certain conditions he will always elect a certain course of action. In
the case of physical environment the matter is very simple. While an
Eskimo may be perfectly free to go naked, it is not a violent stretch of
the fancy to assume that no sane Eskimo will do so as long as he re-
mains in the Arctic regions. When we leave the physical and come to the
social environment, as we necessarily do in discussing the doctrine of
economic interpretation, the essence of the matter is not much changed.
The theory of social environment, reduced to its simplest elements,
means that, even though the individual be morally and intellectually free
to choose his own action, the range of his choices will be largely influ-
enced by the circumstances, traditions, manners and customs of the so-
ciety about him. I may individually believe in polygamy and may be
perfectly free to decide whether to take one or two wives; but if I live
outside of Utah, the chances are very great that I shall be so far guided
in my decision by the law and social custom as to content myself with
one spouse. The common saying that a man’s religion is formed for him
affords another illustration. The son of a Mohammedan may elect to
become a Christian, but it is safe to predict that for the immediate future
the vast majority of Turks will remain Mohammedans.
The negation of the theory of social environment excludes the very
conception of law in the moral disciplines, It would render impossible
the existence of statistics, jurisprudence, economics, politics, sociology
or even ethics. For what do we mean by a social law? Social law means
that, amid the myriad decisions of the presumable free agents that com-The Economic Interpretation of History/35
pose a given community, there can be discovered a certain general ten-
dency or uniformity of action, deviation from which is so slight as not to
impair the essential validity of the general statement. In a race of canni-
bals the abstention by any one savage from human flesh will not influ-
ence the history of that tribe; in the present industrial system the offer on
the part of any one employer to double the customary wages of his
workmen will have no appreciable effect upon the general relations of
labor and capital. The controlling considerations are always the social
considerations. At bottom, of course, the individual is the unit; and ev-
ery individual may be conceived as—ideally, at least—a free agent. But
for individuals living in society the theories that influence progress are
the social chokes, that is, the choices of the majority. The decision of
any one individual is important only to the extent that his influence
preponderates with the great majority; and then it is no longer an indi-
vidual judgment, but becomes that of the majority.131
This is the reason why the “great man theory” of history has well-
nigh disappeared. No one, indeed, denies the value of great men or the
vital importance of what Matthew Arnold calls the remnant. Without
the winged thoughts and the decisive actions of the great leaders the
progress of the world would doubtless have been considerably retarded.
But few now overlook the essential dependence of the great man upon
the wider social environment amid which he has developed.132 Aristotle,
the greatest thinker of antiquity, defended slavery because slavery was
at the time an integral part of the whole fabric of Greek civilization. A
Jefferson would be as impossible in Turkey as a Pobyedonostseff in the
United States, Pheidias is as unthinkable in China as Lionardo in Canada.
On the other hand, the effects ascribed to great men are often largely the
result of forces of which they were only the chance vehicles. Caesar
erected the Roman Empire, but the empire would undoubtedly have come
ultimately with or without Caesar. Napoleon for the time transformed
the face of Europe, but the France of to-day would in all probability
have been in its essentials the same had Napoleon never lived. Washing-
ton and Lincoln assuredly exercised the most profound influence on
their times, but it is scarcely open to doubt that in the end the Revolution
would have succeeded and the Rebellion would have failed, even though
Washington and Lincoln had never existed.
While his appearance at a particular moment appears to us a matter
of chance, the great man influences society only when society is ready
for him. If society is not ready for him, he is called, not a great man, but36/Edwin Seligman
a visionary or a failure. Just as in animal life the freak or sport works
through natural selection as fixed by the environment, so in human life
the great man can permanently succeed only if the social environment is
ripe. Biologists tell us that variation in the species is the cause of all
progress, but that the extreme limit of successful variation from the
parent type in any one case does not exceed a small percentage. The
great man represents the extreme limit of successful variation in the
human race. It is to him that progress seems to be, and in fact often is, in
large measure due. But we must not forget that even then the great mass
of his characteristics are those of the society about him, and that he is
great because he visualizes more truly than any one else the fundamen-
tal tendencies of the community in which his lot is cast, and because he
expresses more successfully than others the real spirit of the age of
which he is the supreme embodiment.133
It is, therefore, an obviously incorrect statement of the problem to
assert that the theory of economic interpretation, or the theory of social
environment of which it is a part, is incompatible with the doctrine of
free will. If by determinism we erroneously mean moral fatalism, deter-
minism is not involved at all.134 The theory of social environment in no
way implies fatalism. Social arrangements are human arrangements,
and human beings are, in the sense indicated, free to form decisions and
to make social choices; but they will invariably be guided in their deci-
sions by the sum of ideas and impressions which have been transmitted
to them through inheritance and environment. So far as great men influ-
ence the march of progress, they can do so only to the extent that they
can induce the community to accept these new ideas as something in
harmony with their surroundings and their aspirations. Given a certain
set of conditions, the great mass of the community will decide to act in
a certain way. Social law rests on the observation that men will choose
a course of action in harmony with what they conceive to be their wel-
fare, and on the further observation that the very idea of an organized
community implies that a majority will be found to entertain common
ideas of what is their welfare. If the conditions change, the common
ideas will change with them. The conditions, so far as they are social in
character, are indeed created by men and may be altered by men, so that
in last resort there is nothing fatalistic about progress.135 But it is after
all the conditions which, because of their direct action or reaction on
individuals, are at any given moment responsible for the general current
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To the extent, then, that the theory of economic interpretation is
simply a part of the general doctrine of social environment, the conten-
tion that it necessarily leads to an unreasoning fatalism is baseless. Men
are the product of history, but history is made by men.136
The second objection to the theory under discussion is closely re-
lated to the first. The economic interpretation of history presupposes
that there are historical laws. Yet this is demurred to by some.
Those, however, who deny the existence of historical laws are evi-
dently laboring under a misapprehension. What they obviously mean is
that the statement of some particular historical law is false or that the
causes of some definite historical occurrence are so complex and so
obscure that it is well-nigh impossible to frame a general explanation.
But they cannot mean that historical laws do not exist. The mere fact
that we have not discovered a law does not prove that there is none.
For what is meant by a scientific law? A law is an explanatory
statement of the actual relations between facts. The processes of human
thought enable us to classify the likenesses and differences in the myriad
phenomena of life, and to subsume the unity underlying these differ-
ences. This unity makes itself known to us under the guise of a causal
relation of one phenomenon to another. When we have succeeded in
ascertaining the relation of cause and effect, we are able to frame the
law. But our inability to discover the law does not invalidate the fact of
its existence. The relations between the stars existed from the beginning
of time; the discovery of the law which enables us to explain these rela-
tions is a result of scientific progress.137
What is true of the exact sciences is equally true of the social sci-
ences, with the difference that the social sciences are immeasurably more
complex because of the greater difficulty in isolating the phenomena to
be investigated and in repeating the experiments. But to deny the exist-
ence of social laws, for instance, simply because some particular al-
leged laws may be convicted of unreality would be to repeat the errors
formerly committed by some of the extremists among the historical econo-
mists and not yet so infrequent as they ought to be. Obedience to law
does not mean that the law causes the phenomenon to happen,—for that
is absurd,— but simply that the law affords an explanation of the oc-
currence.
History, however, is the record of the actions of men in society. It is
not alone past politics, as Freeman said: it is past economics, and past
ethics, and past jurisprudence, and past every other kind of social activ-38/Edwin Seligman
ity. But if each phase of social activity constitutes the material for a
separate science, with its array of scientific laws, the whole of social
activity, which in its ceaseless transformation forms the warp and woof
of history, must equally be subject to law. All social activity may be
regarded from the point of view of the coexistence of phenomena or
from that of the sequence of phenomena. In the one case we arrive at the
static laws, in the other at the dynamic laws. The laws of history are the
dynamic laws of the social sciences or of the social science par excel-
lence. To deny the existence of historical laws is to maintain that there is
to be found in human life no such thing as cause and effect.
The third objection to the doctrine is its alleged socialistic charac-
ter. To this it may be replied that, if the theory is true, it is utterly imma-
terial to what conclusion it leads. To refuse to accept a scientific law
because some of its corollaries are distasteful to us is to betray a lamen-
table incapacity to grasp the elementary conditions of scientific progress.
If the law is true, we must make our views conform to the law, not
attempt to mould the law to our views.
Fortunately, however, we are not reduced to any such alternative.
For, notwithstanding the ordinary opinion to the contrary, there is noth-
ing in common between the economic interpretation of history and the
doctrine of socialism, except the accidental fact that the originator of
both theories happened to be the same man. Karl Marx rounded “scien-
tific socialism,” if by that curious phrase we mean his theory of surplus
value and the conclusions therefrom. Karl Marx also originated the eco-
nomic interpretation of history and thought that his own version of this
interpretation would prove to be a bulwark of his socialistic theory. And
most of his followers have thought likewise. Thus, Mehring tells us that
“historical idealism in its various theological, rationalistic and material-
istic manifestations is the conception of history of the bourgeois class,
as historical materialism is that of the laboring class.”138
It is plain, however, that the two things have nothing to do with each
other. We might agree that economic factors primarily influence progress;
we might conclude that social forces, rather than individual whim, at
bottom make history; we might perhaps even accept the existence of
class struggles; but none of these admissions would necessarily lead to
any semblance of socialism. Scientific socialism teaches that private
property in capital is doomed to disappear; the economic interpretation
of history calls attention, among other things, to the influence which
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thinkers to-day believe, as a result of this historical study, that the prin-
ciple of private property is a logical and salutary result of human devel-
opment, however much they may be disposed to emphasize the need of
social control. The neo-Marxists themselves—such as Bernstein, for
instance—disagree with Marx’s view as to the immediate future of the
class struggle and consider that his doctrine of the “impending cata-
clysm of capitalistic society” has been disproved by the facts of the half
century which has intervened since the theory was propounded. Yet
Bernstein would not for a moment abandon his belief in the economic
interpretation of history, as we have described it.139
In fact, the socialistic application of the economic interpretation of
history is exceedingly nature. If history teaches anything at all, it is that
the economic changes transform society by slow and gradual steps. It
took centuries for feudal society to develop; it took centuries for private
capital to convert feudalism into modern industrial society. The charac-
teristic mark of the modern factory system, still in its infancy, is the
predominance of the individual or corporate entrepreneur on a huge
scale, as we see it typified in the present trust movement in America. To
suppose that private property and private initiative, which are the very
secrets of the whole modern movement, will at once give way to the
collective ownership which forms the mistaken ideal of the socialists, is
to shut one’s eyes to the significance of actual facts and to the teachings
of history itself.140 Rodbertus was at least more logical than Marx when
he asserted that the triumph of socialism would be a matter of the dim
future.
Socialism is a theory of what ought to be; historical materialism is
a theory of what has been. The one is teleological; the other is descrip-
tive. The one is a speculative ideal;141 the other is a canon of interpreta-
tion. It is impossible to see any necessary connection between such di-
vergent conceptions. We must distinguish between the principle of eco-
nomic interpretation in general and some particular application of the
principle. We might agree with the general doctrine and yet refuse to
accept the somewhat fanciful ideals of the non-socialist Loria; we might
agree with the general doctrine and yet refuse to accept the equally fan-
ciful ideals of the socialist Marx. Even if every one of Marx’s economic
theories was entirely false, this fact alone would not in any degree in-
validate the general doctrine of economic interpretation. It is perfectly
possible to be the staunchest individualist and at the same time an ar-
dent advocate of the doctrine of economic interpretation. In fact, the40/Edwin Seligman
writers who are to-day making the most successful application of eco-
nomic interpretation are not socialists at all. Socialism and “historical
materialism” are at bottom entirely independent conceptions.
But while socialism and “historical materialism” are thus in no way
necessarily connected, it does not follow that they may not both be equally
erroneous. All that we have attempted to prove here is that the falsity of
socialism does not, of and in itself, connote the falsity of economic in-
terpretation. The fact that one argument is bad does not imply that other
arguments are good. The validity of the economic interpretation of his-
tory is still open to question and cannot be decided until after a study of
other and far more important considerations.
VIII
Thus far I have set forth the theory of the economic interpretation of
history and have studied some of the objections that are commonly ad-
vanced. There still remain among the criticisms most frequently encoun-
tered two points which seem to be somewhat more formidable. Of these
perhaps the more important is the one that figured fourth in our original
list.142—the objection, namely, that the theory of economic interpreta-
tion neglects the ethical and spiritual forces in history.
It must be confessed, indeed, that the attempts thus far made by the
“historical materialists” to meet the objection have not been attended
with much success.143 On closer inspection, nevertheless, this criticism
also turns out to be in some respects less weighty than has often been
supposed. For what, after all, is the realm of ethical or spiritual forces?
To answer this question it is necessary to distinguish between the exist-
ence of the moral law and its genesis. The failure to draw this distinc-
tion is largely responsible for the confusion of thought which still pre-
vails.
From the historical point of view it no longer admits of reasonable
doubt that all individual ethics is the outgrowth of social forces. Moral
actions are of two kinds,—those which directly affect other individuals,
and those which primarily affect only one’s self. In the first class, com-
prising to-day the great mass of activities to which we apply the term
ethical, the sanction was originally social in character. The conception
of sin or immorality is not the primary conception. Historically we first
find crimes and torts, that is, offenses against society as a whole or
against the individuals comprising society; it is only at a much later
period that the idea emerges of an offense against God or against theThe Economic Interpretation of History/41
moral law as reflected in one’s conscience. When the conception of sin
was once reached it was indeed gradually broadened so as to include the
other offenses, until to-day the commission of either crime or tort in-
volves a sin. But historically sins were not recognized as such before
torts and crimes.
Among brutes there is in all probability no such thing as morality,
no conception of good or evil.144 The female may protect her young
through instinct; but to maintain that this is a moral action is, to say the
least, premature. It no doubt conduces to the perpetuation of the spe-
cies, and thus is a powerful factor in natural selection; but there is noth-
ing moral about the action unless we are willing to apply the term “moral”
to every act—whether instinctive or volitional—that makes for the per-
manence of the species. Morality in its origin indeed implies utility; but
utility does not necessarily connote morality. Even if we predicate mo-
rality of animals, however, future investigators will no doubt explain its
origin on very much the same lines as that of human morality.
For with the institution of human society we are on safer ground
and can trace the glimmerings of a moral development. In the primitive
peoples that still exist in almost the lowest stages of savagery the only
offenses that are recognized are even to-day offenses against the horde
or clan, that is, what we should call public offenses or crimes. Treason,
incest and witchcraft are the three great original crimes that are almost
universally found. They are offenses against the community, because
they imperil, in the estimation of the people, the very existence of soci-
ety. At first there is no idea of sin apart from these offenses. The words
“good” or “bad” are invariably applied only to actions affecting the
social group. The very conception of wrong is a social conception. Cer-
tain actions come to be considered wrong because they are socially inju-
rious. They are punished by society as a whole, and the cause of their
punishment is to be found in the consciousness of society that they are
infractions of the fundamental social customs which have been so labo-
riously developed. For these customs are the teachings of mother nature
drilled into countless generations of savage ancestors. They are lessons
in social necessity, in social selection, where failure to learn or refusal
to obey means the inevitable destruction of the social group—means
social death.145
What has been said of crimes applies also to torts. The earliest
offense of the aboriginal savage against his comrade carried with it no
more moral implication than does to-day the killing of one animal by42/Edwin Seligman
another. Passionate action and retaliation were originally with men, as
they are still with brutes, the form assumed by the desire for physical
mastery: The animal struggle for existence is neither moral nor immoral—
it is unmoral. As soon, however, as the offense of man against man was
taken notice of by society, as soon as the retaliation was regulated by
social custom or law, the punishment was invested with a social sanc-
tion, and the act began to be regarded as reprehensible. When human
beings came to see that certain actions directed against their fellows
were followed by social reprobation or by individual vengeance resting
on social approval, it did not take long to learn that if they valued their
existence in society they must refrain from such actions. In the contest
of man with man each individual always has a chance of victory; he
therefore feels no certainty that a given act will be followed by any
baneful consequences to him. But against a social group, the individual
is powerless and his opportunity for escape from punishment is slight.
In the course of ages social customs grow so rigid that any devia-
tion from the habitual usage comes to be regarded not only as peculiar
but as positively harmful, and therefore reprehensible. The fear of so-
cial disapproval and the hope of social approval become the forces which
lead to the original ideas of evil or good as applied to the social actions
of the individual.
Whether the conception of tort or that of crime is the earlier histori-
cally, need not be discussed here. Most writers assume that torts pre-
cede crimes; and it is undoubtedly true that many torts are gradually
transformed into crimes. On the other hand, it is almost equally certain
that some crimes have preceded torts. Adultery was a crime as incest
before it was a tort; deception was a crime as treason before it was a
tort. However that may be, the point of importance for us is that both
torts and crimes are offenses with a social sanction, and that before this
social sanction existed there was no such idea as that of sin or immoral-
ity applicable to the actions of man to man.
The teachings of language itself afford a clear indication of the so-
cial origin of the conception of morality. The word “ethical ‘ is derived
from   o , which means social custom or usage; just as “moral,” which
Cicero tells us146 he coined in imitation of the Greek, is derived from
mos, denoting precisely the same as   o ,. So also the German term for
moral, sittlich, is derived from Sitte, or social usage. It is society which
has set the original imprint on the very conception of morality.
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tent of morality changes with the state of civilization or with the social
class. Homicide was at one time as little immoral as the killing of one
animal by another is at present; it was simply unmoral. Even to-day it is
not immoral if committed by a soldier in warfare; it becomes murder
and sinful only when the same individual acts in some other capacity
than that of a member of the army. Again, with reference to some acts it
is not quite clear whether they are right or wrong. For instance, the
deception practiced by General Funston to entrap Aguinaldo is declared
by some to be not wholly wrong because it scarcely, if at all, violated the
social usages of civilized nations in warfare—provided, that is, that we
are willing to confess that there is a difference between civilized and
uncivilized warfare. On the other hand, the looting by some of the allies
of the treasures in Pekin and Tien-tsin is generally conceded to be wrong,
because it has recently become a custom reprobated by the social con-
science of the most civilized peoples. Competition is still the rule in
business life: economists call it neither moral nor immoral. But compe-
tition between members of the smaller social group known as the family
is no longer deemed defensible, because it has long since been recog-
nized by society at large that social welfare would, on the whole, be
furthered by the practice of family cooperation. The taking of private
property without compensation is ordinarily considered wrong; but when
a man’s house is blown up to check a conflagration, the action is neither
morally nor legally wrong, because of the overmastering social consid-
erations.
Thus the conception of right or wrong does not attach invariably to
any particular action, because the same action may, under different cir-
cumstances and as applied to varying social stages, be both right and
wrong. Since social considerations make the social actions of the indi-
vidual right or wrong, the idea of good or evil itself is a social product.
What we have thus far said is true primarily of the social actions of
individuals—of the acts of man to man. The principle, however, is equally
applicable to the second class of moral actions referred to above—those,
namely, which seem at first to affect the individual only. An individual,
for instance may be guilt of some particular practice upon himself, which
we popularly declare to be not good for him, or a vice. Properly speak-
ing, however, all that was originally meant was that it was not condu-
cive to his physical or material welfare. Whiskey is not good for an
ordinary child; whiskey is good for an invalid. In the original concep-
tion of good there is no idea of morality—of right or wrong. If an animal44/Edwin Seligman
gorges itself to repletion, we do not ascribe any moral quality to the
action. When the isolated savage first mutilated himself there was no
thought of anything right or wrong, but only of what might be the physi-
cal or material consequences, irrespective of the fact whether these con-
sequences might be brought out by natural forces or by the interposition
of some supernatural spirit or demon. Just as an individual called those
things good which promoted his material welfare, so society called those
things good which contributed to its continued existence. As soon as the
idea of social advantage, however, forces itself through, we reach the
conception of morality. An action is now reprobated or admired accord-
ing as it conduces to the social welfare; and long-continued custom makes
the individual conform his actions and ideas to this social standard, i.e.,
creates in him the feeling of right or wrong.
Thus what is good physically for the individual becomes good mor-
ally only when the social test has been applied. Since this ethical conno-
tation is the result of social forces, it is clear that acts which had origi-
nally only a physical significance for the individual gradually acquired
an ethical significance because of the assumption that they would lead
to certain social consequences. A member of modern society who will
continually gorge himself will acquire certain characteristics that will
make him distasteful to his fellow men, or that will serve as a bad ex-
ample to others. In either case it is the social considerations that attach
an ethical significance to what is at bottom a mere individual physical
act. It is only when men have learned to live in society and when they
have come to fear that some individual practice will react upon their
ideas or their actions in relation to other individuals, that they learn to
attribute a moral quality even to acts which at first blush seem to bear
no relation to any one else. The same is true of the actions of men to-
ward animals. The killing of an animal as such is in itself neither good
nor bad; but cruelty to animals is reprobated because of the probable
effects on the character of the human being who commits the act. Thus
all acts of the individual, whether they seem to affect himself alone or
others, become good or bad only as the result of social considerations.
All individual morality is the outcome and the reflex of social mo-
rality. Conscience itself, or the ability to distinguish between good and
bad, is the historical product of social forces.147 We must therefore agree
with Sutherland when he defines the moral instinct as “that unconscious
bias which is growing up in human minds in favor of those among our
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subscribe to his statement that
there is no foundation of any sort for the view maintained by Kant
and Green and Sidgwick, with so many others, that this inward
sense [conscience] is innate—a supernatural, mysterious and un-
failing judge of conduct. On the contrary what society praises, the
individual will in general learn to praise, and what he praises in
others he will commend in himself.149
Whatever truth there may be in the intuitive or transcendental theory
of ethics as a part of the cosmic scheme, there is no doubt that morality
as applied to human beings is the result of a slow unfolding, in which
social forces have played the chief role.
Such is the origin of the moral sense; its existence and activity are
undoubted facts of human life. It exerts a profound influence on the
individual because it is the crystallization of centuries of social influ-
ences. So slow, however, has been the accumulating force of these influ-
ences that the individual is utterly oblivious of its social origin and im-
portance. But, although conscience exists as a separate category, it does
not lead an entirely independent life. It is like instinct with animals: ages
of dearly bought experience have served to put an almost indelible im-
print on animal habits, until a certain course of action is followed in-
stinctively.150 The imprint, however, is not quite indelible. Just as the
instinct is in its origin an historical product, it will inevitably be slowly
moulded by future experiences. The instinct to preserve life remains;
but the particular method which is instinctively followed changes from
time to time. The instinct persists, but its form is modified. So the fact
of moral consciousness in man and the existence of the ethical and spiri-
tual life in civilized society are undoubted; but the content of this moral
consciousness changes with the same forces that originally gave it birth.
It would, therefore, be absurd to deny that individual men, like masses
of men, are moved by ethical considerations. On the contrary, all progress
consists in the attempt to realize the unattainable w the ideal, the mor-
ally perfect. History is full of examples where nations, like individuals,
have acted unselfishly and have followed the generous promptings of
the higher life. The ethical and the religious teachers have not worked in
vain. To trace the influence of the spiritual life in individual and social
development would be as easy as it is unnecessary. What is generally
forgotten, however, and what it is needful to emphasize again and again,
is not only that the content of the conception of morality is a social46/Edwin Seligman
product, but also that amid the complex social influences that co6perated
to produce it the economic factors have often been of chief significance—
that pure ethical or religious idealism has made itself felt only within the
limitations of existing economic conditions.
The material, as we have seen, has almost always preceded the ethi-
cal. Individual actions, like social actions, possessed a material signifi-
cance long before they acquired an ethical meaning. Etymology helps us
here as it did in the discussion of the meaning of morality itself. A thing
was originally a good in the material sense in which we still speak of
“goods and commodities”; the ethical sense of good as opposed to bad
came much later. In popular parlance we still speak of a broken nail as
“no good,” without desiring to pass any moral judgment on it. The original
meaning of “dear” was not ethical, but economic; a commodity may
still be “dear,” even if we do not love it. To-day we esteem somebody;
originally we put a money value on him (aestimare, from aes, money),
In modern times we appreciate a quality; originally we set a price on it
(adpretium). Everywhere the physical, material substratum was recog-
nized long before the ethical connotation was reached.
Since the material precedes the ethical, it will not surprise us to
learn that the material conditions of society—that is, in the widest sense,
the economic conditions—continually modify the content of the ethical
conception. Let us take a few illustrations at random. Slavery, for in-
stance, was not considered wrong by the great Greek moralists, whose
ethical views on many other topics were at least on a plane with those of
modern times. In the same way the English colonists, who at home would
have scouted the very idea of slavery, soon became in the southern states
of America the most ardent and sincere advocates of the system; even
the clergymen of the South honestly refused to consider slavery a sin.
Had the northern and western states been subjected to the same climatic
and economic conditions, there is little doubt that, so far at least as they
could keep themselves shut off from contact with the more advanced
industrial civilization of Europe, they would have completely shared the
moral views of their southern brethren. Men are what conditions make
them, and ethical ideals are not exempt from the same inexorable law of
environment.
To the ethical teachers of the middle ages feudal rights did not seem
to be wrongs. The hardy pioneers of New England needed a different set
of virtues from those which their successors in a softer age have ac-
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tance would have meant not so much the disappearance of evil as the
disappearance of the colonists. The moral ideal of a frontier society is
as legitimate from the point of view of their needs as the very different
ideal of a later stage of society. The virtue of hospitality is far more
important in the pastoral stage than in the industrial. The ethical rela-
tion of master to workmen under the factory system is not the same as
under the guild system. The idea of honor and of the necessity of duel-
ling as a satisfaction for its violation is peculiar to an aristocratic or
military class; with the change of economic conditions which make for
democracy and industrialism, the content of the conception changes. We
hear much of the growth of international law and of the application of
ethical principles to international relations. We forget that such prin-
ciples can come into existence only when the conditions are ripe. Uni-
versal peace can exist only when one country is so powerful that it
dominates all the others—as in the case of Imperial Rome—or when the
chief nations have grown to be on such a footing of equality that none
dares to offend its neighbor, and the minor countries are protected by
the mutual jealousies of the great powers. Political ethics is here pre-
cisely like private ethics. Individual vengeance does not disappear until
all the citizens are subjected to the power of the strong tyrant, or until
the people are willing to abide by the decision of the court, because of
the conviction that before the law they are all equal. International law
began when economic forces in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
made the first step toward equality by converting the heterogeneous
petty principalities into great nations; international justice and universal
peace will come only when the economic changes now proceeding apace
shall have converted the struggling nations of the present day into a few
vast empires, dividing among themselves, and gradually civilizing, the
outlying colonial possessions, thus attaining a condition of comparative
economic equality. Economic equality among individuals creates the
democratic virtues; economic equality among nations can alone prepare
the way for international peace and justice.
Thus the economic interpretation of history, correctly understood,
does not in the least seek to deny or to minimize the importance of ethi-
cal and spiritual forces in history. It only emphasizes the domain within
which the ethical forces can at any particular time act with success. To
sound the praises of mercy and love to a band of marauding savages
would be futile; but when the old conditions of warfare are no longer
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introducing more civilized practices, which shall be in harmony with the
real needs of the new society. It is always on the border line of the
transition from the old social necessity to the new social convenience
that the ethical reformer makes his influence felt. With the perpetual
change in human conditions there is always some kind of a border line,
and thus always the need of the moral teacher, to point out the higher
ideal and the path of progress. Unless the social conditions, however,
are ripe for the change, the demand. of the ethical reformer will be fruit-
less. Only if the conditions are ripe will the reform be effected.
The moral ideals are thus continually in the forefront of the contest
for progress. The ethical teacher is the scout and the vanguard of soci-
ety; but he will be followed only if he enjoys the confidence of the people,
and the real battle will be fought by the main body of social forces, amid
which the economic conditions are in last resort so often decisive. There
is a moral growth in society, as well as in the individual. The more
civilized the society, the more ethical its mode of life. But to become
more civilized, to permit the moral ideals to percolate through continu-
ally lower strata of the population, we must have an economic basis to
render it possible. With every improvement in the material condition of
the great mass of the population there will be an opportunity for the
unfolding of a higher moral life; but not until the economic conditions of
society become far more ideal will the ethical development of the indi-
vidual have a free field for limitless progress. Only then will it be pos-
sible to neglect the economic factor, which may henceforward be con-
sidered as a constant; only then will the economic interpretation of his-
tory become a matter for archaeologists rather than for historians.
Moral forces are, indeed, no less influential in human society than
the legal and political forces. But just as the legal system, like the politi-
cal system, conforms at, bottom to the economic conditions, so the par-
ticular ethical system or code of morality has been at any given period
very largely an outgrowth of the social, and especially of the economic,
life. If by materialism we mean a negation of the power of spiritual
forces in humanity, the economic interpretation of history is really not
materialistic. But if by economic interpretation we mean—what alone
we should mean—that the ethical forces themselves are essentially so-
cial in their origin and largely conditioned in their actual sphere of op-
eration by the economic relations of society, there is no real antagonism
between the economic and the ethical life The economic interpretation
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a moment subordinate the ethical life to the economic life; it does not
even maintain that in any single individual there is a necessary connec-
tion between his moral impulses and his economic welfare; above all, it
does not deny an interpenetration of economic institutions by ethical or.
religious influences. It endeavors only to show that in the records of the
past the moral uplift of humanity has been closely connected with its
social and economic progress, and that tile ethical ideals of the commu-
nity, which can alone bring about any lasting advance in civilization,
have been erected on, and rendered possible by, the solid foundation of
material prosperity. In short, the economic conception of history, prop-
erly interpreted, does not neglect the spiritual forces in history; it seeks
only to point out the terms on which the spiritual life has hitherto been
able to find its fullest fruition.
IX
The fifth objection to the doctrine of economic interpretation is that
it involves us in absurd exaggerations. In the way that it is commonly
put, however, this objection, even if true, would be beside the mark.
It is indeed a fact that some of the enthusiastic advocates of eco-
nomic interpretation have claimed too much, or have advanced explana-
tions which are for the present at least not susceptible of proof. Thus the
most brilliant of the Italian economists—Achille Loria—has published
a number of books151 in which he has attempted to interpret a vast mass
of historical phenomena from the economic point of view. Many of his
statements are correct, and have been successfully defended against the
attacks of his critics; but some of his explanations are obviously unsat-
isfactory. Above all he has laid too much stress upon the influence of
land in modern society and has thus, in some cases, injured rather than
aided the general theory of economic interpretation, of which only the
particular application—even if an admirably suggestive one—is origi-
nal with him.152
Other less brilliant writers have been guilty of even more extreme
statements. Thus some have sought to make religion itself depend on
economic forces. In this contention there is indeed a modicum of truth.
We know that the religion of a pastoral people is necessarily different
from that of an agricultural community. Marx himself pointed out that
“the necessity for predicting the rise and fall of the Nile created Egyp-
tian astronomy and with it the dominion of the priests as directors of
agriculture.”153 A Russian scholar who had no connection with social-50/Edwin Seligman
ism has shown that somewhat analogous conditions were responsible
for the theocracies of the other Oriental nations.154 Hence it may be
granted that there is an undoubted economic element in the religions of
the past, as well as in those of the present.155 Perhaps the most striking
attempt, however, to carry the theory beyond its legitimate bounds is
that which has sought the explanation of Christianity itself in economic
facts alone.156 It is indeed an accepted opinion nowadays that much of
the opposition to Jesus was due to his radical social program and his
alleged communistic views; it is equally certain that the economic con-
ditions of the Roman Empire favored the reception of these new ideas.
To contend, however, that Christianity was primarily an economic move-
ment, is to ignore the function of the spiritual forces which we have just
been discussing.157
The theory of economic interpretation has been applied not only to
religion but even to philosophy. The whole movement of thought, for
instance, which we associate with the words Greek philosophy has been
explained in a ponderous volume as a phenomenon referable to essen-
tially economic causes.158 Eleutheropoulos,159 it is true, denies that he is
attempting to prove the validity of historical materialism; for he claims
to be a “philosopher” rather than a historical materialist, and he calls
his theory the “Grecian theory of development.”160 On closer inspection,
however, the difference between the two doctrines is scarcely discern-
ible; for the author tells us that the “materialistic conception of history
furnishes the key to the phenomenon of how the general character of
philosophy as a Weltanschauung displays itself in different forms and
shadings.” He states indeed that more than this it cannot do and that
philosophy is also the product of the philosopher as an individual. “The
theory of the economic relations of society as the cause of becoming can
therefore be true only in the sense of the formal cause of development.’‘161
Yet in almost every section he attempts to trace the connection between
the particular philosophic theory and the economic conditions. It is need-
less to say that the attempt is far from successful. The social philosophy
of the Greeks is indeed an outcome of the social conditions, as is to be
expected; but the search for the ultimate principles of life and thought,
as we find it in the greatest of the Greek thinkers, has no conceivable
relation with the actual economic conditions. The explanations of
Eleutheropoulos are almost always farfetched.
The economic interpretation of philosophy has not been confined to
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an economic explanation of von Hartmann’s philosophy, on the ground
that the German bourgeoisie is giving up its class consciousness.162 It is
obviously not worth while to discuss this seriously.
Other more or less extreme applications of the theory are familiar to
all. Among older writers that flourished before the theory itself was
formulated it will suffice to mention Alison, who ascribed the downfall
of the Roman Empire to the monetary difficulties of the period, and
those Spanish historians who made the decay of Spain turn upon the
extension of the alcavala—the general tax on sales. To come to more
recent authors, we need but mention Mr. Brooks Adams163 and Profes-
sor Patten,164 who, amid much, that is suggestive, have centred their
attention upon particular economic conditions in the history of Rome
and England respectively, and have ascribed to these an influence on
general national development out of all proportion to their real signifi-
cance.
Such invalid applications of the theory, however, do not necessarily
invalidate the doctrine itself. We must distinguish here, as in every other
domain of human inquiry, between the use and the abuse of a principle.
The difference between the scientist and the fanatic is that the one sees
the limitations of a principle, where the other recognizes none. To make
any science or any theory responsible for all the vagaries of its over-
enthusiastic advocates would soon result in a discrediting of science
itself. Wise men do not judge a race by its least fortunate members; fair-
minded critics do not estimate the value of a doctrine by its excres-
cences.
It is, however, important to remember that the originators of the
theory have themselves called attention to the danger of exaggeration.
Toward the dose of his career Engels, influenced no doubt by the weight
of adverse criticism, pointed out that too much had sometimes been
claimed for the doctrine. “Marx and I,” he writes to a student in 1890,
are partly responsible for the fact that the younger men have some-
times laid more stress on the economic side than it deserves. In
meeting the attacks of our opponents it was necessary for us to
emphasize the dominant principle, denied by them; and we did
not always have the time, place or opportunity to let the other
factors, which were concerned in the mutual action and reaction,
get their deserts.165
And in another letter Engels explains his meaning more dearly:52/Edwin Seligman
According to the materialistic view of history the factor which is
in last instance decisive in history is the production and reproduc-
tion of actual life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever
asserted. But when any one distorts this so as to read that the
economic factor is the sole element, he converts the statement into
a meaningless, abstract, absurd phrase. The economic condition
is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure—the
political forms of the class contests, and their results, the constitu-
tions—the legal forms, and also all the reflexes of these actual
contests in the brains of the participants, the political, legal, philo-
sophical theories, the religious views...—all these exert an influ-
ence on the development of the historical struggles, and in many
instances determine their form.166
To ascribe everything to economic changes is plainly inadmissible.
Engels himself pointed out in another place that to attempt to explain
every fact of history on economic grounds is not only pedantic, but
ridiculous. Political conditions and national traditions much more often
play an important role. To say, for instance, that Brandenburg of all the
German states should have been selected to become the great power of
the future solely because of economic considerations, is foolish. To claim
that every petty German principality was destined to live or to die for
economic reasons alone, would be as absurd as to ascribe the difference
between the various German dialects solely to economic causes.167
Thus we see the doctrine of “historical materialism” in its crude
form repudiated even by its founders. And it is unfortunately true that
many “historical materialists,” by the very exaggeration and vehemence
of their statements, have brought discredit on a doctrine which, in a
sublimated form, contains so large an element of truth and which has
done so much for the progress of science.
X
What then shall we say of the doctrine of economic interpretation?
That its authors originally claimed too much for it, or at least framed
the doctrine so as to give rise to misconception, is undoubtedly true.
That some of its advocates have gone entirely too far is equally certain.
And it is above all certain that the choice of the term “historical materi-
alism” is unfortunate. The materialistic view of history, like the utilitar-
ian theory of morals, has had to suffer more because of its name thanThe Economic Interpretation of History/53
because of its essence. The one is as little sordid as the other.
The economic interpretation of history, correctly understood, does
not claim that every phenomenon of human life in general, or of social
life in particular, is to be explained on economic grounds. Few writers
would trace the different manifestations of language or even of art pri-
marily to economic conditions; still fewer would maintain that the vari-
ous forms of pure science have more than a remote connection with
social conditions in general. Man is what he is because of mental evolu-
tion, and even his physical wants are largely transformed and trans-
muted in the crucible of reasoning. The facts of mentality must he reck-
oned with.
It is an error,168 however, to suppose that the theory of economic
interpretation can be set aside by refuting the supposed claim that the
economic life is genetically antecedent to the social or the mental life.
The theory makes no such claim.
The whole contention as to the precedence in time of an assumed
cause over a given effect is quite beside the mark. It reminds one of the
old query as to which came first, the egg or the chicken. There is no
longer any dispute among biologists as to the influence of environment.
When, however, we speak of the transformation of a given species, we
do not necessarily mean that the environment was there first, and that
the organism came later. Without the environment there could indeed be
no change; but without the organism there can also be no change. The
adaptation of the organism to the environment simply means that those
among existing variations are selected which conduce most to the per-
petuation of the species. If there were no existing variations or sports
there would be no transformation. The fact that the variation may have
existed before the change in environment occurs is no objection to the
theory of adjustment of the organism to the environment. Although we
say that the organism is determined by the environment, it is quite im-
material which existed first.
So it is with humanity. All human progress is at bottom mental
progress; all changes must go through the human mind. There is thus an
undoubted psychological basis for all human evolution. The question,
however, still remains: What determines the thought of humanity? Even
if we say that the answer is to be sought in the social conditions, the
statement is irrespective of the genetic antecedence of the social envi-
ronment to the mental life. It is quite true that the kernel of Marx’s
whole doctrine is to be found in the celebrated sentence: “It is not the54/Edwin Seligman
consciousness of mankind that determines its existence, but on the con-
trary its social existence that determines its consciousness.”169 However
extreme this statement may he on its purely philosophical side, it is not
open to one criticism so frequently advanced; it does not necessarily
imply that the social existence comes first, and the consciousness after-
wards. Such an implication is as unwarranted as it would be in the
analogous doctrine of biology; when biologists tell us that the organism
is determined by the environment they do not necessarily make any hy-
pothesis as to the priority of the one to the other. The whole question of
genetic antecedence is unimportant.
Of, far more importance, however, is the criticism based on the
alleged insufficiency of the economic factor to explain the changes in
social life in general. There is little doubt that the extreme advocates of
“historical materialism” have laid themselves open to attack from phi-
losophers and historians alike. They have sometimes seemed to claim
that all sociology must be based exclusively on economics, and that all
social life is nothing but a reflex of the economic life.170 No such claim,
however, can be countenanced, and no such claim is made by the mod-
erate advocates of the theory.
The claim cannot be countenanced for the obvious reason that eco-
nomics deals with only one kind of social relations and that there are as
many kinds of social relations as there are classes of social wants. We
have not only economic wants, but also moral, religious, jural, political
and many other kinds of collective wants; we have not only collective
wants but individual wants, like physical, technical, aesthetic, scientific
and philosophical wants. The term “utility,” which has been appropri-
ated by the economist, is not by any means peculiar to him. Objects may
have not only an economic utility, but a physical, aesthetic, scientific,
technical, moral, religious, jural, political or philosophical utility. The
value which is the expression of this utility and which forms the subject-
matter of economics is only one subdivision of a far greater class. For
all the world is continually rating objects and ideas according to their
aesthetic, scientific, technical, moral, religious, jural, political or philo-
sophical value, without giving any thought to their economic value. So
far as utility and value are social in character, that is, so far as they
depend upon the relation of man to man, they form the subject-matter of
sociology. Economics deals with only one kind of social utilities or val-
ues and can therefore not explain all kinds of social utilities or values.
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In this aspect, what is untrue of the individual cannot be true of the
group of individuals. We have passed beyond the time when it was in-
cumbent to explain the fallacy lurking in the phrase “the economic man.”
There is indeed an economic life and an economic motive—the motive
which leads every human being to satisfy his wants with the least outlay
of effort. But it is no longer necessary to show that the individual is
impelled by other motives than the economic one, and that the economic
motive itself is not everywhere equally strong, or equally free from the
admixture of other influences. A full analysis of all the motives that
influence men, even in their economic life, would test the powers of the
social psychologist. There is no “economic man,” just as there is no
“theological man.” The merchant has family ties just as the clergyman
has an appetite.
The wealth which forms the subject-matter of economic activity
can be increased only through the multiplication of commodities; but
this multiplication can take place only in connection with an increased
demand. Increased demand, however, means a diversification of wants.
The things wanted by an individual depend in last resort on his aes-
thetic, intellectual and moral condition. The economic life is thus ulti-
mately bound up with the whole ethical and social life. Deeper than is
often recognized is the meaning of Ruskin’s statement, “There is no
wealth but life,” and of his further claim, “Nor can any noble thing be
wealth except to a noble person.” The goal of all economic development
is to make wealth abundant and men able to use wealth correctly.
If society, then, is an aggregation of individuals and if history is the
record of the activities of the social group and its constituent elements,
history is the parti-colored garb of humanity. In one sense, then, there
are as many methods of interpreting history as there are classes of hu-
man activities or wants. There is not only an economic interpretation of
history, but an ethical, an aesthetic, a political, a jural, a linguistic, a
religious and a scientific interpretation of history. Every scholar can
thus legitimately regard past events from his own particular standpoint.
Nevertheless, if we take a broad view of human development, there
is still some justification for speaking of the economic interpretation of
history as the important one, rather than of an economic interpretation
among other equally valid explanations. The broad reasons which lead
to this conclusion may be summed up as follows.
Human life has thus far not been exempt from the inexorable law of
nature, with its struggle for existence through natural selection. This56/Edwin Seligman
struggle has assumed three forms. We find first the original struggle of
group with group, which in modern times has become the contest of
people with people, of nation with nation. Second, with the differentia-
tion of population there came the rivalry of class with class: first, of the
sacerdotal with the military and the industrial class; later, of the mon-
eyed interest with the landed interest; still later, of the labor class with
one or all of the capitalist classes. Thirdly, we find within each class the
competition of the individuals to gain the mastery in the class. These
three forms of conflict are in last resort all due to the pressure of life
upon the means of subsistence; individual competition, class competi-
tion and race competition are all referable to the niggardliness of nature,
to the inequality of human gifts, to the difference in social opportunity.
Civilization indeed consists in the attempt to minimize the evils, while
conserving the benefits, of this hitherto inevitable conflict between ma-
terial resources and human desires. As long, however, as this conflict
endures, the primary explanation of human life must continue to be the
economic explanation—the explanation of the adjustment of material
resources to human desires. This adjustment may be modified by aes-
thetic, religious and moral, in short by intellectual and spiritual, forces;
but in last resort it still remains an adjustment of life to the wherewithal
of life.
When a more ideal economic adjustment is finally reached—that is,
when science shall have given us a complete mastery over means of
production, when the growth of population shall be held in check by the
purposive activity of the social group, when progress in the individual
and the race shall be possible without any conflict except one for unself-
ish ends, and when the mass of the people shall. live as do to-day its
noblest members—then, indeed, the economic conditions will fall into
the background and will be completely overshadowed by the other so-
cial factors of progress. But until that period is reached, the economic
conditions of the social group and of the mass of individuals must con-
tinue to retain their ascendancy. From the beginning of social life up to
the present the rise, the profess and the decay of nations have been largely
due to changes in the economic relations, internal and external, of the
social groups, even though the facility with which mankind has availed
itself of this economic environment has been the product of intellectual
and moral forces. While the study of the economic factors alone will
manifestly not suffice to enable us to explain all the myriad forms in
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the less true that so long as the body is not everywhere held in complete
subjection to the soul, so long as the struggle for wealth does not every-
where give way to the struggle for virtue, the social structure and the
fundamental relations between social classes will be largely shaped by
these overmastering influences, which, whether we approve or deplore
them, still form so great a part of the content of life.
Human activity is indeed the activity of ‘sentient beings, and the
history of mankind, therefore, is the history of mental development; but
human life depends upon the relation between the individual and his
environment. In the struggle that has thus far gone on between individu-
als and groups in their desire to make the best of their environment, the
paramount considerations have necessarily been economic in character.
The view of history which lays stress on these paramount consider-
ations is what we call the economic interpretation of history. They are
not the exclusive considerations, and in particular instances the action
and reaction of social forces may give the decisive influence to non-
economic factors. Taking man, however, for what he has thus far been
and still is, it is difficult to deny that the underlying influence in its
broadest aspects has very generally been of this economic character.
The economic interpretation of history, in its proper formulation, does
not exhaust the possibilities of life and progress; it does not explain all
the niceties of human development; but it emphasizes the forces which
have hitherto been so largely instrumental in the rise and fall, in the
prosperity and decadence, in the glory and failure, in the weal and woe
of nations and peoples. It is a relative, rather than an absolute, explana-
tion. It is true of the past; it will tend to become less and less true of the
future.
XI
If we ask, finally, what importance shall be assigned to the theory of
economic interpretation, we must consider it from two different points
of view.
From the purely philosophical standpoint, it may be confessed that
the theory, especially in its extreme form, is no longer tenable as the
universal explanation of all human life. No monistic interpretation of
humanity is possible; or, at all events, none will be possible until that
most difficult of all studies—sociology—succeeds in finally elaborat-
ing the laws of its existence and thus vindicating its claim to be a real
science. As a philosophical doctrine of universal validity, the theory of58/Edwin Seligman
“historical materialism” can no longer be successfully defended.
But in the narrower sense of economic interpretation of history—in
the sense, namely, that the economic factor has been of the utmost im-
portance in history, and that the historical factor must be reckoned with
in economics—the theory has been, and still is, of considerable signifi-
cance. What is this significance to economics as well as to history?
In economics the old controversy as to the respective merits of the
deductive and the inductive methods has been laid to rest. It is now
recognized that both methods are legitimate and even necessary. The
older antagonism to the quest for natural law in economics is now seen
to be due to a confusion of thought and to a mistaken identification of
natural law with immutable precepts. When the earlier writers spoke of
the law of free trade, or of the inexorable law of Laissez faire, they did
not use the term “law” in the sense of scientific law, or a statement of the
necessary relations between facts. Yet this is the only sense in which the
term is properly employed. The removal of the older teleological conno-
tation has left the conception of natural law in economics as innocent
and as valuable as it is in any so-called pure science. While the explana-
tion of what actually exists, however, forms an undoubted of all sci-
ence, the study of how these things have come to be what they are is
perhaps of more. importance in the social disciplines than in all others.
The realization of the fact that social institutions are products of evolu-
tion, and that they thus form historical and relative categories, instead
of being absolute categories, is the one great acquisition of modern eco-
nomics which differentiates it toto caelo from that of earlier times.
The acceptance of the principle of growth and of historic relativity
is due to several causes. The historical school of jurisprudence in Ger-
many, under Savigny and Eichhorn, did much to prepare men’s minds
for the reception of what now seems an obvious truth in legal science.
The historical school of economists, under Roscher, Hildebrand and
Knies, did more to familiarize the public with the newer conception.
The influence of Darwin and the application of Darwinian methods to
social science by Spencer and Wallace did still more to reinforce the
idea of growth by the doctrines of evolution and natural selection. The
jurisconsults, however, confined themselves to law, the historical econo-
mists, at the beginning at least, did not realize. the connection between
the economic and the wider social life and the Darwinians came on the
scene at a later date. Comte indeed, influenced no doubt by Saint Simon,
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but his own fund of economic knowledge was exceedingly slight. Long
before Spencer wrote, Karl Marx, in a way undreamt of by the histori-
cal economists, and unrecognized by Comte, not only stated that every
economic institution is an historical category, but pointed out in a novel
and fruitful way the connection between economic and social facts. It is
always hazardous to ascribe a complex change of thought to simple
causes, and there is nb doubt that the newer stream of economic thought
is due to various currents of influence; but it is safe to predict that when
the future historian of economies and social science comes to deal with
the great transition of recent years, he will be compelled to assign to
Karl Marx a far more prominent place than has hitherto been customary
outside of the narrow ranks of the socialists themselves. In pure eco-
nomic theory the work of Karl Marx, although brilliant and subtle, ‘will
probably live only because of its critical character; but in economic
method and in social philosophy, Marx will long be remembered as one
of those great pioneers who, even if they are not able themselves to
reach the goal, nevertheless blaze out a new and promising path in the
wilderness of human thought and human progress. The economic inter-
pretation of history, in emphasizing the historical basis of economic
institutions, has done much for economics.
On the other hand, it has done even more for history. It has taught
us to search below the surface. The great-man theory of history, which
was once so prevalent, simplified the problem to such an extent that
history was in danger of becoming a mere catalogue of dates and events.
The investigation of political and diplomatic relations indeed somewhat
broadened the discipline and for a long time occupied the energies of the
foremost writers. The next step in advance was taken when, under the
influence of the school of historical jurisprudence, more attention was
paid to the relations of public law, and when political progress was
shown to rest largely on the basis of constitutional history. The study of
the development of political institutions gradually replaced that of the
mere record of political events. Legitimate and indispensable as was
this step, it did not go far enough. Those writers, still so numerous, who
understand by history primarily constitutional history, show that they
only half comprehend the condition and the spirit of modern historical
science.
The newer spirit in history emphasizes not so much the constitu-
tional as the institutional side in development, and understands by insti-
tutions, not merely the political institutions, but the wider social institu-60/Edwin Seligman
tions of which the political form only one manifestation. The emphasis
is now put upon social growth, and national as well as international life
is coming more and more to be recognized as the result of the play and
interplay of social forces. It is for this reason that history is nowadays at
once far more fascinating and immeasurably more complicated than
was formerly the case. History now seeks to gauge the influence of
factors some of which turn out to be exceedingly elusive. It attempts. to
introduce into the past the outlines of a social science whose very prin-
ciples have not yet been adequately and permanently elaborated.
Whatever be the difficulties of the task, however, the new ideal is
now more and more clearly recognized. In the formulation of this new
ideal the theory of economic interpretation has played an important, if
not always a consciously recognized, role. It is not that the historian of
the future is to be simply an economic historian, for the economic life
does not constitute the whole of social life. It is, however, the theory of
economic interpretation that was largely responsible for turning men’s
minds to the consideration of the social factor in history. Marx and his
followers first emphasized in a brilliant and striking way the relation of
certain legal, political and constitutional facts to economic changes, and
first attempted to present a unitary conception of history. Even though it
may be conceded that this unitary conception is premature, and even if
it is practically certain that Marx’s own version of it is exaggerated, if
not misleading, it is scarcely open to doubt that through it in large mea-
sure the ideas of historians were directed to some of the momentous
factors in human progress which had hitherto escaped their attention.
Regarded from this point of view the theory of economic interpretation
acquires an increased significance. Whether or not we are prepared to
accept it as an adequate explanation of human progress in general, we
must all recognize the beneficent influence that it has exerted in stimu-
lating the thoughts of scholars and in broadening the concepts and the
ideals of history and economics alike. If for no other reason, it will
deserve well of future investigators and will occupy an honored place in
the record of mental development and scientific progress.
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der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft.”—Ibid., p. 204.
34. “Allein die Vollendung des Idealismus des Stasts war zugleich die
Vollendung des Materialismus der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft.”—Ibid.,
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the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the
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litical and intellectual history of that epoch; that, consequently, etc.,
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“This preposition, which in my opinion is destined to do for history
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Marx... in spring, 1845, he had it already worked out, and put it
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here.”—Manifesto of the Communist Party, by Marx and Engels.
Authorized English translation, edited and annotated by Frederick
Engels, 1888, preface, pp. 5, 6. This preface was written in English
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44.”Die materialistische Lehre, dass die Menschen Produkte der
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Wirklichkeit, ist es das Ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse
.... Feuerbach sicht nicht, dass das ‘religiöse Gemüth’ selbst ein
gesellschafrliches Produkt ist.”—Ibid., p. 81.
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Marx until 1846. Cf. his articles, “Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des
wissenschaftlichen Sozialismus,” in Die neue Zeit, XV (1897), i, 68,
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points emphasized above. Cf. also the article of Kampffmeyer,” Die
ökonomischen Grundlagen des deutschen Sozialismus,” in Die neue
Zeit, V (1887), especially p. 536, where attention is called to Marx’s
historical interpretation of history in his letters to Ruge in 1843.
47. The substance of these essays has been printed by Struve in Die
neue Zeit, XIV (1896), 41–48, under the title of “Zwei bisher
unbekannte Aufsätze von Karl Marx aus den vierziger Jahren. Ein
Beitrag sur Entstehungsgeschichte des wissenschaftlichen
Sozialismus.”
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49. Der Volkstribun, edited by H. Kriege in 1846.
50. “Karl Grün, die soziale Bewegung in Frankreich und Belgien oder
die Geschichtsschreibung des wahren Sozialismus.” This appeared
early in 1847. The whole of this essay has now been printed, with an
introduction by E. Bernstein, in Die neue Zeit, XVIII (1900), 4, 37,
135, 164.
51. “Herr Grün vergisst, dass Brot heutzutage durch Dampfmühlen,
früher durch Wind und Wassermühlen, noch früher durch Handmühlen
produzirt wurde, dass diese vemchiedenen Produktionsweisen vom
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gesellschaftlichen Zustandes: das ahnt Herr Grün nicht.” (Die neue
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Zeltung entitled “Die moralisierende Kritik und die kritisierende
Moral, ein Beitrag zur deutschen Kulturgeschichte.” It was directed
against Karl Heinzen and was of much the same character as his
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53. “A chaque époque historique, la proptiété s’est développée
différemment et dons une série de rapports sociaux entièrement
différents. Ainsi définir la propriété bourgeoise s’est autre chose que
faire l’exposé de tous les rapports sociaux de la production bour-
geoise. Vouloir donner une définition de la propriété comme d’un
rapport indépendant, d’une catégorie á part, d’une idee abstraite et
éternelle, cela ne peut être qu’une illusion de métaphysique ou de
jurisprudence.”—Misère de la philosophie. Réponse á la Philosophie
de la Misère de M. Proudhon. Par Karl Marx, 1847, p. 153.
54. “Les rapports sociaux sont intimement liés aux forces productives.
En acquirant de nouvelles forces productives les hommes changent
leur mode de production, et en changeant leur mode de production, la
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conformément à, leurs rapports sociaux .... Ainsi ces idles, ces cat-
egories, sont aussi peu éternelles que les relations qu’elles expriment.
Elles sont des produits historiques et transitoires.”—Ibid., pp. 99,
100.
55. N’est-ce pus dire assez que le mode de production, les rapports duns
lesquels les forces productives se développent, ne sont rien moins que
des lois éternelles, mais qu’ils correspondent à un développement
déterminé des hommes et de leurs forces productives, et qu’un
chaugement survenu duns les forces productives des hommes umène
nécessairement un changement dans les rapports de production.”—
Misère de la philosophie, p. 115; cf. pp. 152, 177.
56. “La rente, dans le sens de Ricardo, c’est l’agriculture patriarcale
transformée en industrie commerciale, le capital industriel appliqué à
la terre, la bourgeoisie des villes transplantée dans les campagnes.”—
Ibid., p. 159.
57. Ricardo apres avoir supposé la production bourgeoise comme
nécessaire pour déterminer la rente, l’applique néanmoins à la propriété
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errements de tous les économistes qui répresentent les rapports de la
production bourgeoise comme des categories éternelles.”—Ibid., p.
160.
58. “La monnaie, ce n’est pus une chose, c’est un rapport social .... Ce
rapport est un anneau et comme tel, intimement lié à tout
l’enchainement des autres rapports économiques;... ce rapport corre-
spond à un mode de production determiné, ni plus ni moins que
l’échange individuel.”—Ibid. p. 64.
59. “Les machines ne sont plus une catégorie économique que ne saurait
être le boeuf que traine la charrue. Les machines ne sont qu’une force
productive. L’atelier moderne, qui repose sur l’application des ma-
chines, est un rapport social de production, une catégorie
économiques.”—Ibid., p. 128.
60. Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei (London, 1848), pp. 4–7.
61. “Lohnarbelt und Kapital,” Neue rheinische Zeitung, April, 1849.
This was a series of lectures which Marx delivered in 1847 to a Brus-
sels labor union. They have recently been translated by J. L. Joynes
and published in pamphlet form under the title, Wage-Labour and
Capital (London, 1897).
62. These articles appeared under the simple title “1848-1849'’ in the
Neue rheinische Zeitung. Politisch-ökonamische Revue, redigrt von
Karl Marx, 1850. They were not published in pamphlet form until
1895, when Engels edited them under the title Die Klassenkämpfe in
Frankreich, 1848 bis 1850.
63. “Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte” constituted the sec-
ond number of a political monthly called Die Revolution, edited in
New York in 1852 by Joseph Weydemeyer. It was reprinted as a
separate pamphlet by Marx in 1869. A third edition was published in
cheap form in 1885.
64. “Auf den verschiedenen Formen des Eigenthums, auf den sozialen
Existenz-bedingungen, erhebt sich ein ganzer Ueberbau verschiedener
und eigenthümlich gestalteter Empfindungen, Illusionen, Denkweisen
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geselischaftlichen Verhätnissen. Das einzelne Individuum, dem sic
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sie die eigenlichen Bestimmungagründe und den Augangspunkt seines
Handelns bilden.” – Op. cit., 2d ed., p. 26.
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gegebenen und überlieferten Umständen. Die Tradition aller toten
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form. The articles of 1851–52 have appeared under the title, Revolu-
tion and Counter Revolution, or Germany in 1848. By Karl Marx.
Edited by Eleanor Marx Aveling, London, 1896. The letters of 1853–
56 are entitled: The Eastern Question, a reprint of Letters written
1853-1856, dealing with the Events of the Crimean War. By Karl
Marx. Edited by Eleanor Marx Aveling and Edward Aveling, Lon-
don, 1897.
67. “Meine Untersuchung mündete in dem Ergebniss, dass
Rechtsverhältnisse wie Staatsformen, weder aus sich selbst zu
begreifen sind, noch aus der sogenannten allgemeinen Entwicklung
des menschlichen Geistes, sondefn vielmehr in den materiellen
Lebensverhältnissen wurzeln .... In der gesellschaftlichen Produktion
ihres Lebens gehen die Menschen bestimmte, nothwendige, von ihrem
Willen unabhängige Verhältnisse ein Produktionsverhältnisse, die einer
bestimmten Entwicklungsstufe ihrer materielien Produktionskräfte
entsprechen. Die Gesammtheit dieser Produktionsverhältnisse bildet
die ökonomische Struktur der Gesellschaft, die reale Basis, worauf
sich ein juristischer und politischer Ueberbau erhebt, und welcher
bestimmte gesellschaftliche Bewusstseinsformen entsprechen. Die
Produktionsweise des materielien Lebens bedingt den socialen,
politischen und geistigen Lebensprocess überhaupt.”—Zur Kritik der
politischen Oekonomie, Erstes Heft (1859), pp. iv, v
68. “In der Betrachtung solcher Umwälzungen muss man stets
unterscheiden zwischen der matertellen naturwissenschaftlich treu zu
konstatirenden Umwälzung in den ökonomischen
Produktionsbedingungen und den juristischen, politischen, religiösen,
künstlerischen oder philosophischen, kurz ideologischen Formen worin
sich die Menschen diese Konflikts bewusst werden und ihn
ausfechten.”—Ibid., p. v.
69. In the socialistic circles the controversy may be said to date from
1890, when the matter was taken up in the discussions of the
programme of the Social Democratic party in Germany
70. Capital (English translation), II, 367, note 1.
71. “Es ist jedesmal das unmittelbare Verhältniss der Eigenthümer der
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Verhältniss, dessen jedesmalige Form stets naturgemäss einer
bestimmten Entwicklungestufe der Art und Weise der Arbeit, und
daher ihrer gesellschaftlichen Produktivkraft entspricht—worin wir
das innerate Geheimniss, die verborgene Grundlage der ganzen
gesellschaftlichen Construction, und daher auch die politische Form
der Souveränetäts- und Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse, kurz, der
jedesmaligen specifischen Staatsform finden. Dies hindert nicht, dass
dieselbe ökonomische Basis—dieselbe den Hauptbedingungen nach—
durch zahllos verschiedene empirische Umstände, Naturbedingungen,
Racenverhältnisse, von auesen wirkende geschichtlichen Einflüsse u.
s. w. unendliche Variationen und Abstufungen in der Erscheinung
zeigen kann, die nur durch Analyse dieser empirisch gegebenen
Umstände zu
begriefen sind.”—Das Kapital, III, 2, pp. 324, 325.
72. “If one man,” he proceeds, “be sole Landlord, or overballance the
people, he .is Grand Signior . . . and his Empire is Absolute Monar-
chy. If the Few or a Nobility overballance the people, it makes the
Gothic ballance and the Empire is mixed Monarchy (as in Spain and
Poland). If the whole people be Landlords, or hold the lands so di-
vided among them that no one man or number of men... overballance
them, the Empire (without the interposition of force) is a Common-
wealth.”—The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), p. 4.
73. In his Vorrede zur osnabrückschen Geschtchte (1758). See the inter-
esting article, “Justus Möser als Goschichtsphilosoph” von P.
Kampffmeyer, in Die neue Zeit, XVII, x, pp. 516–524.
74. As to St. Simon, see P. Barth in Die Zukunft, IV, 449, and the same
writer’s Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie (1897). Cf.
The French Revolution and Modern French Socialism, by Jessica
Peixotto (1900), pp. 219-212. Both Barth and Peixotto exaggerate
the influence of St. Simon. For Fourier and Le Chevalier, see
Wenckstern’s book on Marx (1896), pp. 250, 251. For Proudhon,
see Mühlberger, Zur Kenthiss des Marxismus (1894).
75. Stein’s views were first advanced in 1842, in Der Socialismus und
Communismus des heutigen Frankreichs. In a later work, published
in 1850, Geschichte der socialen Bewegung in Frankreich, he devel-
oped more fully his idea of society as the community in its economic
organization, and of social, i.e., economic growth as the basis of
legal and political life. This produced a decided effect on Gneist, and
through him on much of modern German historical jurisprudence.70/Edwin Seligman
But Stein’s doctrine exerted little influence on economic thought or
historical investigation in general.
76. For some of their statements, see G. Adler, Die Grundlagen der
Karl Marx’schen Kritik der bestehenden Volkwirthschaft (1887), pp.
214–226. For the more general views of these German socialists, see
G. Adler, Die Geschichte der ersten socialpolitischen
Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland (1885).
77. Cf. a remarkable paragraph in the work of the deservedly forgotten
Lavergne-Peguilhen, Die Bewegungs- und Produktionsgesetze (1838),
p. 225, to which Brentano first called attention. Mehring has pointed
out the slight importance to be attached to this advocate of the feu-
dal-romantic school, in his Die Lessing Legende nebst einem Anhange
über den historischen Materialismus (1893).  pp. 435–441.
78. Cf. Weltmann; Der historische Materialismus (1900), p. 24.
79. The charge that Marx copied from Redbertus was first made by R.
Meyer, Emancipationskampf des vierten Standes (1875), I, 43; 2d
ed., 1882, pp. 57 and 83, and was repeated by Rodbertus himself in
a letter to J. Zeller in the Tübinger Zietschriff für die gesammte
Staalswissenschaft (1879), p. 219. Cf. also Briefe und socialpolitische
Aufsätze yon Dr. Rodhertus-Jagetzow, herausgegeben von Dr. R.
Meyer, n.d. [1880], p. 134. The charge was triumphantly refuted by
Engels in the preface to Das Elend der Philosophie, Deutsch von E.
Bernstein (1885), and more fully in the preface to the second (Ger-
man) volume of Das Kapital (1885), pp. viii-xxi.
80. Cf. A. Wagner, in the Introduction to the third volume of Aus dem
literarischen Nachlase von Dr. Karl Rodbertus-Jagetzow,
herausgegeben von Adolph Wagner and Theophil Kozak (1885), p.
xxxi.
81. Cf.. A. Wagner, in his Grandlegung der politischen Oekonomie, II
(3d ed., 1894), pp. 281, 282, where Marx is described us proceeding
“einseltig entwicklungs gesetzlich, mit den Hilfsmittein seiner
materialistischen Geschtchtsauffassung,” while Rodbertus argues
“ohne die geschichtlichen and dialectischen Hilfsmittel von Marx.”
Cf. also the essay of Kautsky, “Das ‘Kapital’ von Rodbertus,” in Die
neue Zeit, II (1884), p. 350.
82. Bonar, Philosophy and Political Economy (1893), pp. 350, 351,
quoting from Lassalle’s Workmen’s Programme of 1862. All the points
mentioned by Mr. Bonar are found in Marx’s books of 1847 and
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83. It is much to be regretted that Professor Foxwell, in his introduction
to the translation of Menger’s The Right to the whole Produce of
Labour (1899), seems to lend credence to Menger’s contention that
Marx borrowed his theory of surplus value from the English social-
ists, without giving them credit. As every one who is familiar with
the subject knows, both parts of this statement are erroneous. It was
Marx himself who first called attention in detail to the English social-
ists, quoting extensively from Hopkins, Thompson, Edwards and Bray
in La Misère de la Philosophie (pp. 49–62); and to compare their
theories to that of Marx is like comparing the political economy of
Petty to that of Ricardo. It most be remembered, however, that the
author of the book in question is not the economist Carl Menger, but
his brother Anton, the jurist. Professor Ashley must have had these
passages in mind when he was misled into the hasty characterization
of Marx as “a man of great ability, but neither so learned nor so
original as he appeared.” See his Surveys, Historic and Economic
(1900), p. 25. Those who really know their Marx have no such opin-
ion. Böhm-Bawerk, one of the chief opponents of Marx’s theory of
surplus value, has often expressed high admiration for his powers,
and goes so hr as to call him a “philosophical genius” and “an intel-
lectual force of the highest order.” See Karl Marx and the Close of
his System, by Böhm-Bawerk (1898), pp. 148, 221. If for no other
reason than for his admirable and profound treatment of the money
problem in the second (German) volume of Das Kapital, Marx would
occupy a prominent place in the history of economics. His earlier
works show that he was equally strong in other fields of human
thought. As for his learning it may suffice to call attention to the fact
that Marx was the first writer to study in detail the history of early
English economic thought, as well as the first economist to make an
effective investigation based on the English blue books.
84. The criticisms of Masaryk, Die philosophischen und sociologischen
Grundlagen des Marxismus (1899), pp..99–100, and of Weisengrün,
Der Marxismus und das Wesen der sozialen Frage (1900), p. 86, on
this point are without foundation.
85. “Unter den ökonomischen Verhältnissen, die wir als bestimmende
Basis der Geschichte der Gesellschaft ansehen, verstehen wir die Art
und Weise, worin die Menschen einer bestimmten Gesellschaft ihren
Lebensunterhalt produzieren und die Produkte untereinander
austauschen (sowsit Teilung der Arbeit besteht). Also die gesammte72/Edwin Seligman
Technik der Produktion und des Transports ist da einbegriffen. Diese
Technik bestimmt nach unserer Auffassung such die Art und Weise
des Austausches, welterbin die Verteilung der Produkte und damit,
nach der Auflösung der Gemilgesellschaft, such die Einteilung der
Klassen, damit die Herrschafts- und Knechtschaftsverhältnisse, damit
Staat, Politik, Recht, etc. Wenn die Technik, wie sie sagen, ja
grösstenteils vom Stande der Wissenschaft abhängig ist, so noch weit
mehr dieses yore Stande und den Bedürfnissen der Techntk. Hat dis
Gesellschaft ein technisches Bedürfniss, so hilft das die Wissenschaft
rnehr voran als zehn Universitäten.”—Letter of 1894 in Der
sozaialistische Akademiker (1895), p. 373. Reprinted in L Woltmann,
Der historische Materialismus (1900), p. 248.
86. Capital, (English translation), p. 523.
87. Engels’s letters, written to various correspondents between 1890
and 1894, appeared originally in two newspapers, the Leipziger
Volkseitung (1895), no, 250, and Der sozialistiche Akademiker, Oc-
tober 1 and 15, 1895. They have been reprinted, although not all of
them in any one place, by Woltmann, Der historische Materialismus
(1900), pp. 241–250; by Masaryk, Die Grundlagen des Marxismus
(1899), pp. 104; by Mehring, Geschichte der deutschen
Sozialdemokratie, zweiter Theil (2d ed.), p. 556; and by Greulich,
Ueber die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung.” (1897), p. 7.
88. “Ferner sind einbegriffen unter den ökonomischen Verhliltnissen die
geographische Grundlage, worauf diese sich abspielen, und die
thatsächlich überlieferten Reste früherer ökonomischer
Entwicklungsstufen, die sich forterhalten haben, oft nut durch Tradi-
tion oder vis inertiae natürlich auch das diese Gesellschaftsform nach
ausaenhin umgebende Milleu ....
“Wir sehen die ökonomischen Bedingungen sis das in letzter Instanz die
geschichtliche Entwicklung Bedingende an. Aber die Raise ist selbst
ein ökonomischer Faktor .... Die politische, rechtliche, philosophische,
religiöse, litterarische, künstlerische, etc., Entwieldung beruht auf der
ökonomischen. Aber sic alle reagieren auch auf einander und auf der
ökonomischen Basis. Es ist nicht, dass die ökonomlsche Lage Ursache,
allein aktiv ist und alles andere nur passive Wirkung. Sondern es ist
Wechselwirkung auf Grundlage der in letzter Instanz stets sich
durchsetzenden ökonomischen Notwendigkeit....”—Letter of 1894,
ibid.
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90. Edmond Demolins, Comment la route crée le type social, Essai de
géographie sociale, n.d. (1901).
91. These notes are used by Engels in his Der Ursprung der Familie,
des Privateigenthums und des Staats (1884). See preface to first
edition.
92. Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient Society (1877). The following quota-
tions are from the edition of 1878, p. 19. Cf. p. 9.
93. Ibid., p. 26.
94. Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient Society (1877), p. 418.
95. Ibid., pp. 20–26. Morgan’s “horticulture” is really the same as the
“hoe-culture”’ which has recently been heralded by German writers,
like Hahn and Schmoller, as a great discovery of their compatriots.
96. “With the institution of the gens came in the first great rule of inher-
itance which distributed the effects of a deceased person among his
gentiles.”—Ibid., p. 528.
97. “After domestic animals began to be reared in flocks and herds,
becoming thereby a source of subsistence as well as objects of indi-
vidual property, and after tillage had led to the ownership of houses
and lands in severalty, an antagonism would be certain to arise against
the prevailing form of gentile inheritance, because it excluded the
owner’s children whose paternity was becoming more assured, and
gave his property to his gentile kindred. A contest for a new rule of
inheritance, shared in by the fathers and their children, would furnish
a motive sufficiently powerful to effect the change. With property
accumulating in masses, and assuming permanent forms, and with
an increased proportion of it held by individual ownership, descent in
the female line was certain of overthrow, and the substitution of the
male line equally assured. Such a change would leave the inheritance
in the gens as before, but it would place children in the gens of their
father and at the head of the agnatic kindred.”—Lewis H. Morgan,
Ancient Society (1877), pp. 345–346. Cf. p. 531.
98. Ibid., p. 341 et passim.
99. The patriarchal family is summed up as “an organization of ser-
vants and slaves under a patriarch for the care of flocks and herds,
for the cultivation of lands and for mutual protection and subsis-
tence. Polygamy was incidental.” ibid., p. 504. Cf. pp. 465–466.
100. “The growth of property and the desire for its transmission to chil-
dren was in reality the moving power which brought in monogamy to
insure legitimate heirs and to limit their number to the actual progeny74/Edwin Seligman
of the married pair.”—Ibid. p. 477.
“As finally constituted, the monogamian family assured the paternity of
children, substituted the individual ownership of real as well as of
personal property for joint ownership, and an exclusive inheritance
by children instead of agnatic inheritance.”—Ibid., p. 505. Cf p. 389.
101. Ibid., p. 552.
102. The League of the Iroquois (1849); Systems of Consanguinity and
Affinity of the Human Family (1871); and Houses and House Life of
the American Aborigines (1881).
103. This is true of McLennan, Westermaarck, Starcke, Tyler, Lumholtz,
Pest and many others. It is true also, although to a somewhat less
degree, of my honored colleague, Professor Giddings. Almost the
only passage of importance for our purposes in his Principles of
Sociology (1896) is the one on p. 266: “It seems to be an economic
condition which in the lowest communities determines the duration
of marriage and probably also the line of descent through mothers or
fathers.” CA., however, in addition, pp. 276, 288 and 296. In a more
recent article Professor Giddings substantially concedes that “these
writers [Marx and his followers] may be held to have made good
their main contention.”— International Monthly, II (1900), 548
104. Maxime Kovalevsky, “Tableau des origines et de l’évolution de la
famille et de la propriété,” Skrifter utgifna af Lorenska Stifelsen
(Stockholm, 1890).
105. Die Formen der Familie und die Formen der Wirthschaft (1896).
106. Recht und Sitte auf den verschiedenen wirthschaltlichen
Kulturstufen. Erster Then (1896).
107. Die Verwandschaftsorganisationen der Australneger (1894).
108. Die ökonomischen Grundlagen der Mutterherrschaft,” in Die niue
Zeit, XVI, I. A French version appeared in Le Devenir social, V
(1898), 42, 146, 330, under the title, “Les Bases économiques du
matriarcat.”
109. Ibid., p. 108. Cunow, however, does not remind us that all this had
been pointed out in 1884 by Dargun in his admirable study, which is
not so well known as it ought to be: “Ursprung und
Entwicklungsgeschichte des Eigenthums,” in the Zeitschrift für
vergeichende Rechtwissenscaft, V, especially pp. 59–61. Professor
Giddings, in his article in the Political Science Quarterly for June,
1901 (XVI, 204), alludes to the older theory as based on “the Mother-
Goose philosophy of history.” Dargun and Cunow are the writersThe Economic Interpretation of History/75
who have emancipated us.
110. Ibid., p. 115.
111. Ibid., pp. 141, 176, 209.
112. Cunow, op. cit., pp. 238, 241.
113. “Arbeitstheilung und Frauenrecht; zugleich dn Beitrag zar
materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung,” in Die neue Zeit, XIX, I.
114. Ibid., p. 103.
115. Ibid., pp. 152, 180.
116. Ibid., p. 276.
117. Dr. Julius Pikler, Der Ursprang des Toteminmus; ein Beltrag zur
materialistlschen Geschichtstheorie (Berlin, 1900). A somewhat dif-
ferent, but equally “materialistic,” interpretation has been given by
Frazer, in the Fortnightly Review for l899, and by Professor Giddings,
in a note on “The Origin of Totemism and Exogamy,” in the Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, XIV, 274.
118. Dr. H. J. Nieboer, Slavery as an Industrial System (The Hague,
1900). See the review of this work in the Political Science Quarterly
September, 1901.
119. Ettore Ciccotti: I1 Tramonto della schiavitù nel mondo antico
(Torino, 1899). The suggestive sketch of the whole topic by Eduard
Meyer, in his address “Die Sklaverei im Alterthum” (1898), suffers
in some important points from the fact that the well-known historian
is only imperfectly acquainted with the results of recent economic
studies.
120. Francotte, L’Industrie dans la Grèce ancienne (1901).
121. Pöhlmann, Geschichte des antiken Sozialismus und Communismus
(1901).
122. Cf. the series of essays by Paul Ernst on “Die sozialen Zustände
im römischen Reiche vor dem Einfall der Barbaren,” in Die neue
Zeit, XI (1893), 2, and the suggestive book of Deloume, Les Manieurs
d’argent à Rome (1892).
123. M. Beer, “Ein Beltrag zur Geschichte des Klassenkampfes im
hebräischen Alterthum,” Die neue Zeit, XI (1893), 1, p. 444. For
similar studies by Kautsky and Lafargue, see Mehring, Die Lessing-
Legende, p. 481.
124. Karl Bürkli: Der wahre Winkelried; die Taktik der alten
Urschweizer (1836). See especially pp. 143–184. Cf. also the same
author’s  Der Ursprung der Eidgenossenschaft aus der
Markgenossenschaft und die Schlacht am Morgarten (1891). In this76/Edwin Seligman
monograph emphasis is laid on the economic origin of the Swiss de-
mocracy in general.
125. G. Des Marez, Les Luttes sociales en Flandre au moyen âge (1900),
p 7.
126. Cf. the article by Prutz, “The Economic Development of Western
Europe under the Influence of the Crusades,” The International
Monthly, IV (August, 1901), 2, p. 251.
127. See especially Engels, Der deutsche Bauernkrieg; Bernstein’s es-
say on “The Socialistic Currents during the English Revolution,” in
Die Geschichte des Sozialismus in Einzeldarstelluegen, I, 2, and
published as a separate work under the title, Communistische und
demokratisch-socislistlsche Strömungen in der englischen Revolu-
tion des XVII. Jahrhunderts (1895); and Belfort Bax’s study on the
Social Side of the German Reformation, of which two volumes have
thus far appeared
128. Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte.
129. Lamprecht’s general views may be found in his Alte end nene
Richtung in der Geschjchtswlssenschaft and Was ist Kukurgeschichte?
(1896). A list of some recent articles on the controversy may be found
in Ashley, Surveys Historic and Economic, p. 29. To these may now
be added the article of Below in the Historische Zeitschift, LXXXVI
(1900), I. Perhaps the most striking work of this nature that has been
accomplished by an American scholar is the article of E. V. D.
Robinson, “War and Economics in History and Theory,” Political
Science Quarterly, XV (1900), 581–586.
130. Hume, with Helps to the Study of Berkeley, ch. x, in Huxley’s
Collected Essays vol. vi, p. 220.
131. For an application of this doctrine to the theory of economics. see
an article by the present writer on “Social Elements in the Theory of
Value” in the Quarterly Journal of Economics (June, 1901).
132. In his interesting essay on “Great Men and their Environment”
professor William James says many things which command assent,
especially in connection with the geographical interpretation of his-
tory. But he misses the main point, although he hints at it on pp. 226–
227. See The Will to Believe and Other Essays (1897).
133. An interesting attempt to study in detail the causes of the appear-
ance of great men in a particular country and a particular field has
been made by Professor A. Odin, of the University of Sofia, in his
two-volume work, Génèse des Grands Hommes (1895). The authorThe Economic Interpretation of History/77
devotes himself specifically to the great; men in French literature,
concluding that the social and economic environment, not the force
of heredity or chance, is the capital factor in the phenomenon.
134. The passage sometimes quoted from Marx, Das Kapital, III, s, p.
355, does not refer to the general problem of determinism, as Masaryk
(Grundlagen des Marxismus, p. 232) seems to think, but to freedom
in the sense of liberation from the necessity of working all day in the
factory and having no time for self- improvement.
135. It is impossible to speak in any but respectful terms of Professor
James. The limits of our toleration, however, are well-nigh reached
when we find such an extreme statement as this: “I cannot but con-
sider the talk of the contemporary sociological school about averages
and genera] causes the most pernicious and immoral of fatalisms.”—
See the chapter on “The Importance of Individuals,” in The Will to
Believe, p. 262. This apparently shows an egregious misconception
of the very nature of social law.
136. Those interested in the discussion of this point by the socialists
may be referred to the articles of Kautsky, Bernstein and Mehring in
Die Neue Zeit, XVII (1899), 2, pp. 4, 150, 268 and 645. Engels has
also touched upon it several times, in his Anti-Dühring, in his Ludwig
Feuerbach (2d ed., 1895), p. 44, and more fully in his letter of 1894
published in Der sosialistische Akademiker (1895), p. 373, and re-
printed by Woltmann, Der htstorische Materialismus, p. 250.
137. This does not, of course, imply that the law possesses an objective
existence apart from our apperceptions. A consideration of this prob-
lem belongs to the science of epistemology. The questions of the “Ding
an sich” aud of the necessary limits of human thought have no place
in this discussion; nor have they any bearing upon the particular ob-
jection here alluded to. For the contention in question is not that his-
torical laws have no objective existence, bet that them is no possibil-
ity of our framing an adequate explanation of causal relations,
138. Die Lessing-Legende, p. 500.
139. In his most recent book Bernstein speaks of the “realistische
Geschichtsbetrachtung die in ihren Hauptziigen unwiderlegt geblieben
ist”—Zur Geschichte und Theorie des Sozialismus (2d ed, 1901) p.
285.
140. Marx, indeed, in one passage predicts the formation of trusts. But
he, as well as his followers, overlooks the fact that concentrated capi-
tal, like separated capital, can do its best work only under the lash of78/Edwin Seligman
individual initiative and personal responsibility
141. The “scientific socialists” deny this, but in vain.
142. Political Science Quarterly, XVII, 88
143. This is true not only of the Germans, but of the English, like Bax,
and of the French, like Labriola, Devilles and Lafargue. Cf. espe-
cially Mehring, Die Lessing Legende, p. 463, and the articles in Die
Neue Zeit: by Bax, vol. xv, pp. 175, 685; by Kautsky, vol. xiv, p.
652, and vol. xv, pp. 231, 260; by Bernstein, vol. xi, p. 782. Bernstein
has also treated the subject in his more recent books.
As to the French socialists, see Labriola, Essais sur la conception
matérialiste de l’histoire (1897); Lafargue, Idéalisme et matérialisme
(1895); and Deville, Principes socialisten (1896).
144. The reason why it is not safe categorically to deny the existence of
morality among animals is that the older contention of an essential
psychical difference between man and animals has broken down be-
fore the flood of recent investigation. Comparative biology has proved
that psychological phenomena begin far down in animal life. Some
writers even profess to find them among the very lowest classes of
beings—so low indeed that it is even doubtful whether they belong to
the animal or the vegetable kingdom. For a popular presentation, see
Binet, The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms (1894). Binet’s views,
however, are not shared by the more conservative biologists.
145. Hall, Crime in its Relation to Social Progress. Columbia Univer-
sity Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, XV (1902), 55.
146. Cicero, De Fato, cap. 1.
147. The theory of the social origin of morality has been brilliantly
worked out by von Ihering in the second volume of his masterpiece,
Der Zweck im Recht (1883; 2d ed., 1886). Von Ihering made no at-
tempt to apply the theory to the general doctrine here under consider-
ation. In English literature the earliest treatment of the subject is found
in Darwin’s Descent of Man, ch. iv. For an interesting adumbration
of the theory of the social origin of morality, cf. the brilliant but very
incomplete passages of W. K. Clifford in his articles “On the Scien-
tific Basis of Morals” and “Right and Wrong,” published originally
in 1875 and reprinted in his Lectures and Essays, II (1879}, esp.
111, 112, 114, 119, 123, 169, 172–173. The admirable work of
Alexander Sutherland, The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct
(1898), bases the development of morality on the growth of sympa-
thy through the family. Thus he tells us that “from the usages thatThe Economic Interpretation of History/79
grew up within the family sprung morality; from those that sprung
up between the families grew law,” II, 138; or again, “True morality
grows up within the family,” II, 146; or again,” Moral rules as to
bloodshed, honesty, truth, chastity are all, by birth, of family growth,”
II, 151. Sutherland forgets, however, that in early society it was not
the family in the modern sense, but the horde, the clan and the tribe
that formed the unitary social groups. Sutherland’s book, neverthe-
less, is the first one in English clearly to point out that the (social)
utilitarian theory of ethics has nothing “low” or “sordid “about it, but
is really compatible with the most idealistic view of the universe. For
the earlier and cruder opposition on the part of the intuitionists, see
Miss Cobbe’s “Darwinism and Morals,” Theological Review (April,
1872), pp. 188–191.
148. Op. cit., II, 306.
149. Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct, II, 72.
150. This is not the place to discuss the various theories of instinct. A
popular discussion may be found in Alfred Russell Wallace’s Dar-
winism, p. 441, and a more technical one in Weissmann’s Essays on
Heredity and in C. L Morgan’s Habit and Instinct. It will suffice
here to quote from Romanes: “There is ample evidence to show that
instincts may arise either by natural selection fixing on purposeless
habits which chance to be profitable, so converting these habits into
instincts without   intelligence being ever concerned in the process; or
by habits, originally intelligent, becoming by repetition automatic.”—
Mental Evolution in Animals, p. 267.
151. One of these has been translated by Professor Keasbey under the
title: The Economic Foundation of Society (1899). The original Ital-
ian was published in 1885, and a third edition appeared in 1902 un-
der the title: Le Basi economiche della costituzione sociale. His other
important works bearing on the same general subject are Analisi della
proprietà capitalista (1889), and his more recent works, La
Sociologia, il suo compito (1901) and Il Capitalismo e la scienza
(1901).
152. It is a singular testimony to the neglect of Marx’s writings outside
of Germany that so many critics in England, France and Italy should
have hailed Loria as the originator of the doctrine of economic inter-
pretation. Even Professor Keasbey is not entirely free from this error.
See the Translator’s Preface (p. ix) to the English edition. Loria him-
self, however, has made no such claim. See his recent book, Marx e80/Edwin Seligman
la sua dottrina (1902), esp. cap. 31: “Intorno ad aleune Critiche dell’
Engels.”
153. Capital, Engl. Transl., p. 523, note I.
154. Metschnikoff, La Civilisation et les grandes fleuves historiques
(1889). Marx, of whom Metschnikoff was entirely ignorant, had said
twenty years before: “One of the material bases of the power of the
state over the small disconnected producing organisms in India was
the regulation of the water supply.” Capital, p. 523, note 2. Kautsky
was led by this passage to study the conditions of the other Asiatic
theocracies and came to the same conclusion without knowing any-
thing of Metschnikoff, whose book had appeared in the interval. See
Die neue Zeit, IX (1899), 447, note.
155. Some of the social and economic aspects of modern religious move-
ments have been emphasized by Thomas C. Hall, The Social Mean-
ing of the Modern Religious Movement in England (1900).
156. The economic interpretation of Christianity was first advanced by
Kantsky in “Die Entstehung des Christenthums,” Die neue Zeit, III
(1885), 481, 529, and by Engels in his essay on “Bruno Bauer und
das Urchristenthum” in the Züricher Sozialdemokrat (1882), Nos.
19. 20. It was developed by Engels in a subsequent article in Die
neue Zeit in 1894, by E. H. Schmitt, also in Die neue Zeit, XV (1897),
I, p. 412, and by Kantsky in the chapter on “Der urchfistliche
Kommunismus” in the first volume of Die Geschichte des Sozialismus
(1895).
157. Some of the objections have been urged by Hemann, Sozialistische
Irrlehren von der Entstehung des Christenturns (1899). Kohler, how-
ever, goes entirely too far in the other direction.
158. This view was first advanced by Dr. Stillich in an article in Die
neue Zeit, XVI, I, p. 580. This turned out, however, to be a plagia-
rists from the lectures of a Greek privat-docent at Zürich, mentioned
in the next note. See Die neue Zeit, XVI, 2, p. 154.
159. Wirthschaft und Philosophie, oder die Philosophic and die Lebens-
Auffassung der jewells bestehenden Geselischaft. Etste Abtheilung:
Die Philosophic und die Lebens-Auffassung des Griechentums auf
Grund des geselischafilichen Zustinde. Von Abr. Eleutheropoulos
(1898; 2d ed., 1900).
160. Preface to second edition.
161. Op cit., p. 16.
162. Masaryk, Die Grundlagen des Marxismus, p. 146.The Economic Interpretation of History/81
163. The Law of Civilisation and Decay.
164. The Development of English Thought
165. This letter is printed in Der sozialistiche Akademiker, October 1,
1895, and is quoted by Greulich, Ueber die materialistische
Geschichts-Auffassmung (1897), p. 7, and by Masaryk, Die
Grundlagen des Marxismus (1899), p. 104.
166. “Nach materialistischer Geschichts-Auffassung ist das in letzter
Instanz bestimmende Moment in der Geschichte die Produktion und
Reproduktion des wirklichen Lebens. Mehr hat weder Marx noch Ich
je behauptet. Wenn nun Jemand das dahin verdreht, das ökonomische
Moment sei das einzig bestimmende, so verwandelt er jenen Satz in
eine nichtssagende, abstrakte, absurde Phrase. Die ökonomische Lage
ist die Basis, aber die verschiedenen Momente des Ueberbaues—
politische Formen des Klassenkampfes und seine Resultate—
Verfassungen, nach gewonnener Schincht durch die siegende Klasse
festgestellt, u. s. w.—Rechtsformen, und nun gar die Reflexe aller
dieser wirklichen Kämpfe im Gehirn der Beteiligten, politische,
juristische, philosophische Theorien, religiöse Anschauungen und
deren Welterentwicklung zu Dogmensystemen, üben auch ihre
Einwirkung auf den Verlauf der geschichtilchen Kämpfe aus und
bestimmen in vielen Fällen vorwiegend deren Form. Es ist elne
Wechselwirkung idler dieser Momente, worth schliesslich durch alle
die unendliche Menge von Zufälligkelten (d. h. von Dingen und
Ereignissen, deren innerer Zusammenhang untereinander so entfernt
oder so unnachweisbar ist, dass wir ihn als nicht vorhanden betrachten,
vernachlissigen können) ils Notwendigkeit die ökonomische Bewegung
sich durchsetzt. Sonst wäre die Anwendung der Theorie auf eine
beliebige Geschichtsperiode ja leichter als die Lösung einer einfachen
Gleichung ersten Grades.’‘—Der sozialistische Akademiker (Octo-
ber 15, 1895), p. 351. Reprinted in Widtmann, Der historische
Materialismus (1900), p. 239. Cf. also Engels’s view of the impor-
tance of idealistic elements in a second letter of 1890 printed in the
Liepziger Volkzeitung (1895), No. 250 (reprinted in Wolfmann, p.
243), and in a further letter of 1893 printed in the second edition of F.
Mehring’s Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, Zweiter Theil,
p. 556.
167. “Es wird sich kaum ohne Pedanterie behaupten lassen, dass unter
den vielen Kleinstaaten Norddeutschlaods gerade Brandenburg durch
ökonomische Notwendigkeit und nicht auch durch andere Momente82/Edwin Seligman
(vor allen seine Verwicklung, durch den Besitz von Preussen, mit
Polen und dadurch mit internationalen politischen Verhältnissen—
die ja auch bei der Bildung der östrelchischen Hausmacht entscheidend
sind) dazu bestimmt war, die Grossmacht zu werden, in der sich der
ökonomische, sprachltche und seit der Reformation auch religiösw
Unterschied des Nordens vom Süden verkörperte. Es wird schwerlich
gelingen, die Existenz jedes deutschen Kleinstaates der Vergangenheit
und Gegenwart oder den Ursprung der hochdeutschen
Lautversehiebung, die die geographische, durch die Gebirge von den
Sudeten bis zum Taunus gebildete, Scheidewand zu einem förmlichen
Riss durch Deutschland erweiterte, ökonomisch zu erklären, ohne
sich lächerlich au machen.”— Der sozialistische Akademiker, loc.
cit.
168. Committed, for instance, by my honored colleague, Professor
Giddings, in his interesting article “The Economic Ages,” Political
Science Quarterly (June, 1901). Almost the same argument was made
at the same time by Salvadori, La Scienza economica e la teoria dell’
evoluzione (1901) pp. 58–63.
169. “Es ist nicht das Bewusstsein der Menschen, das ihr Sein, sondorn
ihr gesellschaftliches Sein, das ihr Bewusstsein bestimmt.”—Marx,
Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie, Vorwort, p.v. The whole con-
troversy of Hollitscher, Das historische Gesetz (1901), pp. 93 et seq.,
misses the real point.
170. Among these extremists must be classed Loria, who has advanced
his views most clearly in his interesting work La Sociologia. In this
he seeks to distinguish an economic sociology from the biologic or
psychologic sociology of other writers.
171. An interesting criticism of “historical materialism” from this point
of view and with especial reference to the influence of economics on
law is made by Rudolf Stammler, professor of Law in Halle, in his
rather ponderous work, Wirthschaft und Recht nach der
materialistischen Geschichts-Auffaasung (1896). Stammler is far
fairer to Marx than most of the opponents of the theory. He considers
the attempt of Marx as in many ways a most remarkable one and
deserving of high praise; but he nevertheless objects to the theory as
unfinished and not completely thought out. Stammler does not con-
tend that no monistic explanation of social life is possible. In fact his
own synthesis is constructed on teleological lines—an explanation
which regards all past social life in the light of social purposes or aThe Economic Interpretation of History/83
social ideal. With special reference to the relation between law and
economics, he defines social life as a “common activity regulated
from without” (ein äusserlich geregeltes Zusammenwirken), and
maintains that these external rules govern at once the legal, political,
economic and other social relations. It is unphilosophical, then, to
claim that any one set of social relations is the general cause or ex-
planation of other social relations. They are all the common product
of the same cause.